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I. Introduction
Something is wrong when the First Amendment can be
interpreted to offer more protection to a comic book featuring worm-
like creatures inspired by famous albino rock stars than to a letter to
the editor debating the working conditions in Southeast Asian
* Director, Donald Biederman Entertainment and Media Law Institute and Professor of
Law, Southwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Cam Devore and
Bruce Johnson for their helpful suggestions and support in the preparation of this article.
factories. But this is precisely the strange state of affairs wrought by
two decisions of the California Supreme Court considering how the
commercial nature of a message should be factored into the
constitutional equation.1 California is not alone; the degree to which
commercial motives should affect First Amendment protection is a
subject of ongoing debate.2
Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court first began
seriously to address whether and to what extent the commercial
purpose of a speaker should affect First Amendment analysis.3 At the
time, this was something of a revolution, as it had been previously
accepted that purely commercial speech was constitutionally
unprotected.4 As it began to develop doctrine in this area, the Court
announced a pronounced difference between the protection afforded
to commercial and noncommercial speech, and warned of the
potential danger in equating the two:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a
leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with
respect to the latter kind of speech.5
While the Court spent a great deal of time and effort defining the
kinds of interests that will support a restriction on speech which is
labeled as "commercial," it gave scant attention to when speech
should be so classified,6 or, for that matter, why it is important to
categorize speech as commercial or noncommercial in the first place.7
1. Compare Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003) (upholding First
Amendment defense) with Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2003) (rejecting First
Amendment defense).
2. A number of commentators have argued that commercial speech should get little,
if any, protection because it doesn't fit within any of the commonly accepted functions that
animate the First Amendment. See Thomas Jackson & John Jeffries, Commercial Speech,
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L REv. 1, 7-8 (1979); Lillian
BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech- An Inquiry Into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978). Others have recognized the important
role that commercial information plays in society and have argued for more expansive
protection. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery and the First Amendment. A Case
for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 777 (1993); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627
(1990).
3. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-21 (1975).
4. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,55-56(1942).
5. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978).
6. The most meaningful effort the Court has made to address the distinction is
Bolger v. Young Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 65-68 (1983).
7. See infra Part II.B.
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AT THE INTERSECTION OF COMIC BOOKS
Just because a speaker may have a commercial motivation does
not mean that the resulting expression is categorized as "commercial"
and, thus, is entitled to less First Amendment protection than other
kinds of speech. Many forms of commercially motivated expression
are without doubt entitled to the full scope of protection offered by
the First Amendment. There is no credible argument that the creator
of a non-obscene pornographic web site or phone sex service is
entitled to diminished constitutional protection simply because he is
motivated to do so by a desire to profit . Nor does a newspaper lose
its constitutional protection from defamation because the claim arises
out of an advertisement the newspaper ran purely for profit.9 Movies,
books, music, and other informational and artistic products are fully
protected by the First Amendment notwithstanding their creation for
profit. °
Most of the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions have
involved traditional forms of advertising exclusively designed to sell a
particular product or service. With few exceptions, it has been almost
a given that the kind of speech involved in these cases was of the less
worthy variety, and no serious efforts have been made to look at the
implications of the doctrine when less easily categorized expression is
involved.
It appeared that the Court might address this issue during its
2003 term when it agreed to consider a civil suit against Nike over the
accuracy of the company's efforts to defend its overseas
manufacturing standards." The Nike case, much of which involved
forms of speech usually recognized to be of the fully protected
variety, such as letters to the editor and the like, highlighted both the
importance and difficulty of distinguishing commercial from fully
protected speech under the current legal regime. 12 If Nike's speech
about its factory working conditions were held to be commercial,
applicable legal standards would have arguably subjected the
company to strict liability for any false or deceptive statements, a
standard very different from that applicable if the speech were found
& See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Commcn's of Cal. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989).
9. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,265-66 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118-23 (1991); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
11. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003),
cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
12. For an overview of Nike's challenged expression see Bruce E. H. Johnson and
Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content Is the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1243, 1245-49 (2004).
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to be fully protected. 3 But was the speech purely commercial and
how is that determination to be made? And even if it is nakedly
commercial, why should such speech get less protection than other
kinds of speech?
Unfortunately, Nike never resulted in a substantive decision;
instead, it was dismissed on the grounds that the writ was granted
improvidently.14 So at least for the time being, the lower courts are
left to struggle in their efforts to figure out how and when to factor
commercial motives into the First Amendment equation. It is a
struggle that cannot be resolved satisfactorily if we continue to adhere
to the current approach: drawing categorical distinctions between
commercial and noncommercial speech which are largely artificial,
certainly unwieldy, and likely unworkable. Does it really make sense
that a letter to the editor about an important social issue should
receive only limited protection because of an underlying motive to
sell athletic apparel, whereas a fanciful depiction of albino rock stars
Johnny and Edgar Winter is fully protected even where used with an
undeniable commercial motive to sell comic books? Can we really
draw a principled line between the commercial and noncommercial in
an environment where motives are increasingly mixed? Consider, for
example, whether a feature television news magazine report about
the finale of the hit reality show The Apprentice on NBC's Dateline
should get less protection than the same feature on CBS because
NBC also airs The Apprentice and, thus, has a direct commercial
motive to promote the show to its viewers. 5
This article examines how a speaker's commercial interests factor
into evaluating First Amendment protection. Part II looks at how
commercial motives have been treated in the First Amendment
equation and considers certain flaws in drawing distinctions between
commercially motivated speech and other kinds of expression. Part
III considers the implications of a different approach that largely
jettisons any attempt to draw broad categorical distinctions based on
the underlying commercial motivation for communication and,
13. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 283-84.
14. Nike v. Kasky, cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
15. See NBC becoming "Trump TV," available at
http://www.wndu.com/entertainment,032004/entertainment_24749.php (last visited Oct.
23, 2005); cf O'Grady v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 5: 02 CV 173, 2003 WL
24174616 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2003) (characterizing as commercial speech interstitial
television programming comparing documentary about Navy pilot with soon to be
released motion picture).
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instead, evaluates such expression in the same way that other kinds of
fully protected speech are evaluated.
II. Commercial Interests and the First Amendment
A. The Relevance of Commercial Interests to First Amendment Protection
The case law has a schizophrenic quality when it comes to
factoring in whether a commercial purpose affects the degree of First
Amendment protection given to expression. Generally speaking, the
cases can be loosely grouped into three categories.
First, there are the decisions involving traditionally pure forms of
expression where any commercial motive pertains to the sale or
distribution of the expression itself. Most forms of news and
informational media fall into this category as do most genres of
entertainment and art. Where traditionally pure forms of expression
are involved, the speaker's profit motive is simply irrelevant. The
Supreme Court has been clear that in these kinds of cases, the
presence of a profit motive does not diminish constitutional
protection. 16 Thus, speech of this sort which is defamatory, 7 invades
one's privacy," causes serious emotional distress,' 9 or adversely affects
minors °  is entitled to considerable constitutional protection
regardless of whether its motivation is to inform, enrich or simply
profit.
Second are the cases involving various forms of traditional
advertising and marketing where the commercial motive solely
concerns the sale of products or services. 2 This body of law
encompasses what has come to be known as the Supreme Court's
16. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952).
17. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254. Sullivan is a particularly apt example as it arose
out the publication by the Times of and advertisement, not even the newspapers
expression of its own view.
1& See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
19. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
21. Advertising designed to sell speech based products presents an interesting
question of classification. Sometimes such advertising appears to be treated the same as
the underlying speech while in other cases it is treated as commercial speech. Compare
Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 785-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(book advertising commercial speech) with Lacoff v. Buena Vista Pub'g, Inc., 705
N.Y.S.2d 183, 188-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (book advertising fully protected). If one
accepts the premise of this article, any distinction becomes less important, and I, therefore,
do not address this issue in any detail.
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Commercial Speech Doctrine, involving expression which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction," 22 although it at times
extends beyond that somewhat limiting characterization to more
creative forms of promotion as well. 3 In this second category, the
commercial purpose of the speaker has been the determinative factor
in how much First Amendment protection will be extended. Although
a number of justices appear open to reformulating their views on the
subject, current law extends a reduced level of First Amendment
protection to this kind of speech. Laws aimed at restricting
commercial expression will be sustained on a showing that they are
supported by a narrowly tailored, substantial government interest,24
whereas the same law aimed at fully protected expression would
require the most compelling and least restrictive of justifications. 2
Similarly, constitutional defenses to civil claims arising out of speech
which allegedly causes tortious injury, such as defamation 26 or the
right of publicity, 27 may not be available where the speech is
categorized as purely commercial.
Finally, there is what I will call mixed purpose speech, which can
take at least two different forms. There are mixed speech products
which incorporate informational or artistic expression into what are
generally viewed as ordinary non-speech related products. Examples
include T-shirts containing some kind of message or artistic design,
28
mass market prints and posters,29 and what are often called
collectibles. 30 This category also includes mixed message speech-
speech where an independently relevant editorial message is closely
22. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (pamphlets
discussing venereal disease).
24. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm'n., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
25. See. e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Service Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530, 538-39
(1980).
26. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990). The reasoning of US. Healthcare has been
criticized by commentators and rejected by some courts. See generally STEVEN G. BRODY
AND BRUCE E. H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FIRST
AMENDMENT GUIDE § 7.2.1 (2d ed. 2005).
27. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
28. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
29. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Montana v. San
Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
30. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga.
1982).
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connected at least indirectly to efforts by the speaker to sell some
product. Nike's attempts to defend its Southeast Asian labor practices
is the most recent and controversial example. Where this kind of
mixed purpose speech is involved, the law is truly chaotic. Sometimes
commercial purposes seem to matter and sometimes they do not. As I
discuss more fully below, no dominant approach has emerged to
define when and to what extent a speaker's commercial motive is
relevant in this context. Some courts analyze these cases under the
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine.31 Others, particularly in
the right of publicity and trademark arenas, have developed a
different approach which tries to divine whether the speech is
fundamentally commercial or expressive. 2 It is this central focus on
the commerciality of the expression to define the degree of First
Amendment protection to which I now turn, examining first, what I
believe to be the central flaws in doing so, and second, why the
preoccupation with such categorization is unnecessary and harmful.
B. Problems with Continuing to Categorize Expression Based on the
Speaker's Commercial Purpose
The Supreme Court has offered two principal "common sense"
justifications for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial
speech.33 First, it is said that commercial speech is ordinarily easier to
verify than other kinds of speech and, second, it is more durable
because its underlying profit motive reduces the likelihood the
speaker will be deterred.
In their 1990 article, Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner
powerfully dissected these twin rationales, demonstrating that in fact
they often do not support the distinction. They pointed out that
while these considerations may indeed support the easiest commercial
speech cases, they bear little relevance to the more complex scenarios
that are the acid test of any legal doctrine. For example, while a
simple claim that one product is cheaper than another may well be
easily verifiable and relatively immune from being chilled given the
31. See, e.g., Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (informational
pamphlets on sexually transmitted diseases contained commercial speech); O'Grady v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 5:02 CV173, 2003 WL 24174616 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
19, 2003) (interstitial programming which promoted a motion picture found to be
commercial speech).
32. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003); Comedy III Prods.,
21 P.3d at 797.
33. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
34. Kozinski and Banner, supra note 2, at 629-30.
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seller's need to increase sales, Kozinski and Banner recognized that
most real world situations are not nearly so neat.35 Conversely, many
kinds of fully protected speech are easily verifiable and unlikely to be
deterred but still entitled to full constitutional protection.6 One
suspects, for example, that it would take a great deal to deter-or
chill in First Amendment terms-the distribution of the Harry Potter
books or movies given the hundreds of millions-indeed billions-of
dollars in revenues that they generate.37
Perhaps equally important is a point not fully developed by
Kozinski and Banner: the reasons advanced to support a categorical
distinction between commercial and other kinds of speech often have
little to do with the underlying interests being served by particular
limitations on expression. Verifiability assumes a greater ability on
the speaker's part to avoid error; durability assumes a reduced
likelihood that the speaker will be deterred by fear of punishment for
an honest mistake. At least where restrictions ban or severely limit
expression that is not alleged to be false or misleading, it is difficult to
see how these characteristics lend any support to distinguishing
different genres of expression.
Most of the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
developed from regulations involving these kind of complete bans,
and until recently, this fairly obvious point went largely unnoticed in
the Court's opinions. Of late, however, the relevance of the proffered
justifications to particular regulations has received some attention:
When a State regulates commercial expression to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive or aggressive sales
practices.., the purpose of its regulation is consistent with
the reasons for according constitutional protection to
commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict
review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the
rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands. 38
A plurality of the Court now appears willing to move at least
some distance away from the kind of categorical distinctions that have
35. Id at 634-37.
36. Id. at 637-38.
37. See CNN.com, Potter's still magic for J. K Rowling, (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/SHOWBIZ/movies/11/14/potter.rowling/index.html.
38. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [28:145
governed commercial speech and impose a more searching review
regardless of classification, at least where there is no question of the
expression being false. 9 For the time being, however, a majority of
the Court continues to adhere to the doctrine in its current form.
n°
Beyond these theoretical concerns, Kozinski and Banner also
underscored the complexity-one might say futility-in trying to
separate commercial from other kinds of speech. They recognized
that commercially motivated speech often contains both commercial
and non-commercial elements which can be very difficult to
distinguish. A relatively simple example is music videos. As miniature
programs, often containing significant artistic and entertaining
elements, they are indistinguishable from much other video
programming except for length and are a "form of expression we
instinctively think of as deserving as much protection as full length
films .. .,,4 At the same time, they are without doubt created with a
primary purpose to sell recorded music and market recording artists.
So are they commercial speech or fully protected?
Moving beyond videos, Kozinski and Banner posited a whole
range of what I call mixed message speech, some real and some
imagined,42 some closely connected to the sale of a particular product
and some not,43 but all very hard to distinguish from speech that is
ordinarily thought to be entitled to full First Amendment protection.
The difficulty in telling commercial from noncommercial speech
is of no small moment, as the development of much of our First
Amendment doctrine has been driven by concerns about the inability
to draw principled lines of distinction. In Cohen v. California, 4 for
example, the Court was not much impressed with Mr. Cohen's choice
of epithets to express his views about the draft, but it was impressed
by the dangers it foresaw if it started down the road of distinguishing
39. See id. In Liquormart, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg,
expressed this view. See id. at 501-05. Justice Thomas expressed an even more expansive
view. See id. at 528. Justice Scalia was enigmatic in stating that he "shared" some of
Justices Stevens' and Thomas' views. See id. at 528.
40. Although basic doctrine remains unchanged for now, even those Justices favoring
the status quo appear to agree that the test for determining whether the First Amendment
protects commercial speech is today being "more searchingly" applied. 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. Kozinski and Banner, supra note 2, at 641.
42. Among other things, Kozinski and Banner discussed the use of "advertorials,"
advertisements that discuss important public issues related to particular products or
services. See id at 643-44.
43. For example, a Phillip Morris promotion that offered free copies of the Bill of
Rights but didn't mention any product. See id at 645-46.
44. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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crude from refined speech.45.For similar reasons, courts have refused
to permit distinctions based on the quality of literature or art since
there is no way to separate out that which contributes little without
deterring much of what we valuei 6 If this is so-and few would
seriously argue the point, I suspect-it is fair to ask why we think
courts will have any greater success when trying to separate
commercial from other forms of expression.
One thing is certain: in the fifteen years since Kozinski and
Banner wrote, the problems of categorizing this kind of speech have
not gotten any easier. Indeed, continued media consolidation and the
emergence of new technologies for the receipt and management of
information and entertainment have, if anything, magnified the
difficulties.
As media interests have continued to consolidate with the
attendant demands of Wall Street for accelerated profit growth,
companies increasingly look for creative ways to generate additional
revenue.4 One effect of this has been a lowering of traditional
barriers between the creative/editorial and commercial sides of the
business.48 Further fueling the breakdown is technology. The
dominant advertising medium-television-is in the throes of a
paradigm shift in how it will have to make its money in a world
populated by digital video recorders which obviate the need for
viewers ever again to watch a traditional commercial. 49 On top of this,
the internet is competing with traditional media for the attention of
television viewers and newspaper readers, creating new options and
45. Id. at 25 ("For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is more
distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric.").
46. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal.
1979); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUSTON L.
REV. 903, 909 (2003).
47. Ken Auletta has chronicled the effects of the increasing focus on synergy at two
of the country's leading media conglomerates: Times Mirror and Tribune Company. See
KEN AULETIA, BACKSTORY: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF NEWS 63-118 (2003).
48. See id. at 63, 73, 77, 87, 103.
49. See Stuart Elliott, NBC and Mazda Jointly Promote New Lineups, THE N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2005, at C-5 ("The sponsored 'First Look' campaign offers another
example of how major marketers are becoming involved in the entertainment
programming of media companies. The goal is to tightly weave a brand or product into
content and to counter consumers' growing habit of zipping, zapping or otherwise
avoiding traditional commercials."); Ted Johnson, Tivo-lution, VLIFE, June/July 2004, at
54 ("About the only thing that can be agreed upon in the Byzantine world of media
soothsaying is that something will change. That in and of itself has industries positioning
and posturing so they won't be the ones left behind when that day comes.").
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challenges in the consumption of information and entertainment.
Consider a few examples of how all of this is playing out.
e In 2003, NBC aired a reality television series called The
Restaurant about a celebrity chef and the making of his new eatery.
The show was partly funded by the ad firm Magna Global USA which
brought in Coors and American Express. It is not hard to figure what
kind of beer was featured at the restaurant or what was the credit
card of choice. But, The Restaurant is not an aberration:
This is what life is like in the new world of "branded
entertainment" which is viewed as a possible solution for ad
skipping. The idea, eventually, is to make a show that has
advertising messages look almost like a commercial free show. 5°
• An on-line entertainment web site, Heavy.com, has a cartoon
series entitled Pimp My Weapon. The inaugural episode was
described by the Los Angeles Times:
Posing as a do-it-yourself TV show on the mythical "How-To
Network," the short video features two computer generated figures
in gladiator garb demonstrating a wicked-looking chain sword. The
muscle-bound-but-high-pitched host matter-of-factly discusses such
benefits as the "comfy killing distance" and the "handy fire option"
as he hacks at his co-host.5'
The program incorporated no banner ads, pop-ups or other overt
pitches, because the whole show was in a sense a pitch for Sony's
video game God of War which provided the characters, sets and
action, but not the dialogue.52
- In 1999, the Los Angeles Times devoted an entire issue of its
Sunday magazine to the opening of the new Staples Center arena.
The Times was a founding partner in the arena, paid $3 million to
advertise there, and agreed to publish annually a special section on
the arena and split the advertising revenues of the section. The
Sunday magazine was just such a section, being described by the
Times' advertising director as a "promotional vehicle."53
e The Host International company wanted to create a new line of
airport bars based on the tavern made famous in the hit television
show bearing its name: Cheers. Paramount, which produced and
owned the rights to Cheers, liked the idea of an ancillary revenue
50. Johnson, supra note 49, at 83.
51. Jon Healey, Net Firm Focuses on Blurring the Line, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at
C1.
52 Id.
53. AULETrA, supra note 47, at 73. The agreement between the Times and Staples
Center was heavily criticized by other media interests, particularly in regard to the failure
of the Times to disclose the arrangement. See ict
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stream, so it licensed Host to use various elements from the program.
Among the features in the Cheers bars were animatronic figures of
two of the most beloved characters in the show who were fictional
patrons of the bar. The actors who had portrayed these characters felt
the figures looked too much like them and objected to the perceived
use of their identities on right of publicity grounds.!"
So which of these examples involve commercial speech? None
involved any overt sales pitch so they would not qualify under the
Court's most predominant definition of commercial speech as that
which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."55 Yet
each had an unavoidable commercial character: each was motivated
by a desire to sell, referred at least implicitly to a particular product,
and involved a speaker with an economic purpose. 6 Yet just as
unavoidably, each example had independent editorial or creative
elements involving information of public concern or
dramatic/comedic performances.57 How do we decide which prevails,
the commercial or the creative? And if one is to be preferred, why?
We know from well established Supreme Court doctrine that we
cannot base our decision simply on a profit-driven motive; otherwise,
all kinds of expression that is fully protected would suddenly become
subject to regulation in ways that few would find acceptable. But if
such a motive coupled with these other elements (product reference
and promotional component) is enough to make the speech
commercial, much of what we see in motion pictures or on television
today might also qualify5 -- or at least would present the kind of
litigation risk than can deter expression as effectively as direct
regulation.5 9
54. See Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
56. See Bolger v. Young's Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983).
57. The hardest to see this in is the Cheers example, but as recognized by Judge
Kozinski, "[t]he portrayal of the Cheers characters is core protected speech. Using Norm
and Cliff dummies in a Cheers-themed bar is a dramatic presentation." Wendt v. Host
International, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
58. Examples abound of increasingly creative product integration into programming
that ordinarily would be thought to be fully protected by the First Amendment. See. e.g.,
Caroline Wilbert, Turner South to Plug Its Own Wares, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION, June 10, 2004, at 1F.; NBC becoming "Trump TV," available at
http://www.wndu.com/entertainment,032004/entertainment_24749.php (last visited Oct.
23, 2005).
59. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n. 21 (1978); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,302-03 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring).
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We do not know what the courts would do with the first three
examples, as they have not been the subject of litigation. Ironically,
however, the fourth example, which fits least comfortably within the
Court's commercial speech framework, was in fact treated by the
Ninth Circuit the same as traditional commercial advertising. 
°
Reliance on the notion that commercial speech is somehow
categorically less worthy of First Amendment protection has
continued to confound lower courts by forcing them to draw lines
where lines cannot, or should not, be drawn. This stilted line drawing
has taken two principal forms, neither of which is productive.
Many courts when faced with difficult cases like these strain to fit
them into the Court's traditional commercial speech framework by
cramming the proverbial square peg into a round hole. Courts in the
Ninth Circuit, for example, were faced with a fashion article in Los
Angeles Magazine that featured pictures of famous people that had
been digitally altered to make it appear that they were wearing
currently popular clothing.6' One of the photographs was of the actor
Dustin Hoffman from the movie Tootsie, where he played a male
actor posing as a female actor. The magazine used a well known
promotional photograph of Hoffman dressed as the female character,
but it digitally superimposed a different dress on him. Some
information about the dress was provided, but otherwise there was
little editorial content. Hoffman sued for a violation of his right of
publicity. The district court, looking at the absence of significant
editorial content in the magazine article, determined that it involved
commercial speech so the First Amendment presented no
impediment to the claim.62 The Ninth Circuit looked at the same
article and saw speech of the fully protected variety.63
An even more perplexing case arose from a book that recounted
the exploits of an investment club of elderly women known as the
Beardstown Ladies. The Ladies' central claim to fame was that they
had achieved better returns on their investments than most
professional money managers. The problem was that they really had
60. Although the Court in Wendt didn't explicitly declare the figures to be
commercial speech, the cases it relied on to support its analysis involved commercial
advertising. See Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810-13 (9th Cir. 1997).
61. The alterations were fully disclosed so there was no element of deception in this
respect. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
62. See Hoffman v. CapitalCities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (C.D. Cal.
1999). The exact basis for the district court's conclusion is not clear, as it did not cite any
authority in support of its ruling.
63. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d at 1184-86.
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not. Their exceptional performance was the result of a computational
error which only came to light after publication of the book. Since the
book did not defame or invade anyone's privacy, it was fully
protected by the First Amendment and not subject to any claim. Not
to be deterred, creative lawyers brought false advertising suits based
on the book jacket, which incorporated the Ladies' claim to high
returns. A panel of the California Court of Appeal found the book
jacket to be commercial speech, notwithstanding that the information
came directly from the book to which it was attached.64 A New York
court reached precisely the opposite conclusion, holding the jacket to
be fully protected just like the book.6
The difficulty here is not just limited to the interpretation of the
scope of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. The
notion that "commercial" expression is less worthy than other kinds
of expression has spilled beyond more traditional advertising
regulation to infect other forms of expression which under no
reasonable formulation of the doctrine qualify as commercial speech.
This has occurred mainly in right of publicity and trademark law. In
these cases, courts do not even try to fit within the commercial speech
framework, but instead have developed other approaches to
determine if the expression possesses the requisite commerciality to
defeat First Amendment protection. In a right of publicity case, the
Missouri Supreme Court recently determined First Amendment
protection based on whether expression is predominantly
commercial. 66 The California Supreme Court has created a
"transformative" test to make the same determination.67 Other
approaches also exist, all of which I discuss in more detail in Section
III.B. of this article. The point I want to make for now is that
devaluing speech because it is in some respect commercial has
broader ramifications, which are antithetical to accepted First
Amendment values.
Although it once had some currency, with the exception of
obscenity and commercial speech, a categorical approach to First
Amendment decision-making has largely been abandoned.6 While
64. Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal.Ct. App. 1999).
65. LaCoff v. Buena Vista Publ'g, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
66. See Doe v. TO Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373-74 (Mo. 2003).
67. See Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,808 (Cal. 2001).
68. Until the 1960s, categories of speech encompassing the lewd, obscene, profane,
libelous and insulting were said to lie outside the protective boundaries of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). As Professor
Rod Smolla has recognized, modem First Amendment cases have largely "repudiated"
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obscenity law raises its own set of concerns, that category differs from
commercial speech in two important respects. First, the kinds of
expression that qualify even for consideration as obscene are more
limited than what might be deemed commercial. Only explicitly
sexual expression may be obscene, 69 whereas, an extremely broad
range of speech may be commercial. Second, by definition, obscene
speech is limited to that which lacks any serious artistic, literary,
social, or political value,70 whereas commercial speech may be chock
full of such value. Do we really mean to say that the kind of non-
obscene, but highly pornographic movies that litter late night cable
television should get more First Amendment protection than say
Nike's efforts to defend its labor practices in Asia, a subject of
vigorous public debate?7'
This absence of any limitation on commercial speech like that
imposed on obscenity leads to the more important point that the
concept of broadly devaluing such a diverse category of expression
ignores the important place it occupies in our country's idea
marketplace. It was not long ago that a successful presidential
campaign was built on the mantra: "It's the economy, stupid." If
commercial issues play such an enormously important role in our
system, we should be encouraging the broadest possible range of
expression about or related to them, and not penalizing it. It is
undoubtedly true that certain kinds of commercial speech regulation
serve some very important interests, but given how flawed our
current system is for separating out those cases, is it not worth asking
if a better way exists?
Il. An Alternative Approach
Not only is the current approach to commercial speech animated
by a series of flawed assumptions, but it is also methodologically out
of step with recent developments in First Amendment doctrine. This
is illustrated by the Court's decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul.72 Faced in
such an approach in favor of a more searching interest based analysis of restrictions on
expression. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 160-61 (1992).
Today only obscenity and commercial speech are still treated in such categorical terms.
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
REGULATION OF MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RELIGION 17 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
70. See id. at 24.
71. See United States v. Playboy Entm't. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (non-
obscene sexually explicit cable channels entitled to full First Amendment protection.).
72. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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that case with a category of speech, fighting words, generally thought
to be completely outside the bounds of the First Amendment, 73 the
Court nonetheless struck down a law which used content distinctions
as the basis for punishing only certain kinds of expression falling into
that category.74 It was not that the state didn't have a sound basis for
punishing the kind of speech involved in R.A.V. 75 But because those
interests could have been served without making content-based
distinctions, the Court required the state to take a more neutral
approach.
One lesson of R.A.V. relevant to commercial speech is that
proper First Amendment analysis should proceed from a critical and
sensitive consideration of the particular characteristics of a restriction
on speech, not from generalized content-based assumptions about an
entire category which are applied regardless of their applicability or
necessity in a particular context.76 Even where there is an important
or compelling government interest being served, if there is a way to
approach the problem effectively without making content-based
value judgments, we should ordinarily take it.
The notion that commercially motivated speech is less valuable
than other speech seems at odds with the R.A. V. principle and diverts
the focus in these cases from the most relevant considerations. Rather
than asking how valuable a particular kind of expression is, First
Amendment analysis ordinarily starts by examining the nature of the
restriction the government is seeking to impose.7, If a restriction
73. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
74. RA.V. concerned a city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct.
See 505 U.S. at 381-82. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the ordinance as
encompassing only that class of expression known as fighting words. Id.
75. The ordinance was designed to protect "basic human rights of members of groups
that have historically been subjected to discrimination... ," interests the majority
conceded to be both compelling and furthered by the regulation. Idt at 395.
76. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,424 (1993).
77. As Professor Smolla aptly put it, "[c]ommercial speech ... should presumptively
enter the debate with full First Amendment protection. The theoretical question should
not be what qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but what, if
anything, disqualifies it." Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First
Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 777,
780 (1993). Smolla recognized that "[u]nless... speech violates some legally cognizable
interest ... [it] is protected." Id. at 787. The Court hasn't been entirely consistent on this
point. Compare Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967), quoting Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941) ("No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the
freedom there guaranteed for speech... bears an inverse ration to the... importance of
the ideas seeking expression."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[a]ll
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance... have the full protection of
the guaranties [of the First Amendment]") with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
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makes distinctions based on the content of speech, we ordinarily
become suspicious and demand the most compelling of justifications."
Conversely, neutral restrictions, not based on content and which
affect speech incidentally, are less suspect and are given greater
latitude. Content neutrality encompasses both generally applicable
laws79 as well as neutral restrictions on the time, place or manner of
speaking.80 Both kinds of limitations have historically been governed
by standards that are virtually identical to those employed by the
commercial speech doctrine.81
An exception to the extreme suspicion accorded to content-
based restrictions has been recognized in some instances for speech
that is alleged to be false or misleading. Restrictions on false speech,
even when content-based, have been given more latitude than
content-based restrictions aimed at speech which is not provably
false. Most of the cases examining this principle have involved
defamation claims," but the Court has applied the principle in other
contexts as well.83
Although no constitutional value exists in false statements of
fact,8' the Court has required the toleration of some falsity so that
speakers are not unduly deterred out of fear of being punished for an
honest mistake.8 The question in these cases revolves around how
much "breathing space" 86 must be given to someone who disseminates
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.5 (1985) ("This Court on many occasions has recognized
that certain kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than
others."). With the exception of commercial speech, however, the kinds of speech the
Court has devalued have been determined to have no significant value in terms of its
contributing to public discourse. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (speech on matters
of "purely private concern."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity);
Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at571-72 (fighting words). Even where it is offensive or vulgar,
speech which plays any meaningful role in informing or enriching the idea marketplace is
entitled to the full range of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 25(1971) ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
7& See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397(1989).
79. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
80. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
81. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001); Board of Trustees
of the State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477 (1989).
82. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
83. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light invasion of privacy); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
84. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
85. See id. at 340-41.
86. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
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arguably false speech. The mechanism used by the Court to regulate
this is to require in some cases that a degree of fault be established in
addition to proof of a factual error. 87 Whether and to what extent
fault must be proved depends on a balancing of the respective
interests at stake.
The Court has never defined precisely how this balance is to be
undertaken, but it has offered some guidance. The balance of
interests is to be conducted in the context of a particular kind of
restriction. In other words, the rules that apply, for example, to
defamation claims do not necessarily apply to other kinds of claims,
although they may if careful analysis dictates that result. 8 Although
each type of regulation requires a separate analysis within a given
category, the balancing is not to be struck on a case by case basis.
Because such an approach "would lead to unpredictable results and
uncertain expectations," courts instead "must lay down broad rules of
general application.""
In various contexts, three separate interests have been
considered in determining what kind of accommodation must be
made for false or misleading speech: the interests of the speaker,90 the
interests of the state in regulating,9' and the interests of the public in
receiving information. 92 The inquiry into the interests of the speaker
has focused on the need for prophylactic protection sufficient to
ensure that one will not unduly refrain from speaking as the result of
the fear of liability over an honest error.93 Inquiry into the state
interest looks at a number of factors, including the harm that will
result from erroneous speech and how great the need for protection
is.94 Finally, the interest of the public has been factored in by
considering whether the speech that is to be restricted is of broad
concern or of importance only to a small, narrow audience. 9
The category of speech that I earlier defined as purely expressive
is already approached in this way-that is, with extreme suspicion for
87. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-48; Time Inc., 385 U.S. at 389-90.
88. See Time Inc., 385 U.S. at 390.
89. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.
90. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-72.
91. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
92. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-72 (First Amendment ensures wide open robust and
uninhibited debate on public issues).
93. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-41.
94. See id. at 341-45.
95. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-60
(1985).
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content-based distinctions and slightly more flexibility where false or
misleading expression is involved-notwithstanding that it may be
associated with a commercial motivation in many instances. Indeed,
one of the seminal First Amendment cases of the modern era, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,96arose out of a newspaper advertisement
about civil rights abuses, a fact that did not diminish the level of
protection to which the paper was entitled even though its motivation
for publishing it was purely commercial. 97 The question to which I
now turn is whether we can we approach the kinds of speech where
commercial purpose has mattered in the same way without unduly
compromising the government's ability to regulate the commercial
marketplace?
A. Jettisoning the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court has addressed commercial speech regulation
in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from the provision of abortion
services"' to the sale of liquor.99 Its cases have usually involved
expression that is easily categorized as traditional advertising,
although in a few cases it has applied the doctrine to mixed message
speech as well.'0° Significant governmental interests in protecting
consumers can be implicated in these cases, °1 and it is important to
consider whether those interests would be served as well by a system
that did not seek to draw categorical distinctions based on the
speaker's motivation. A good starting point is to ask how the
government would have fared in the decided cases had it been unable
to argue that its regulations were aimed only at a categorically less
valuable form of expression. Would such an approach provide
sufficient flexibility for the government to act where necessary to
protect consumers from real and substantial abuse? The answer
involves consideration of two different kinds of regulations.
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. Id. at 265-66.
9& See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
99. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
100. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 63 n.4 (1983) (pamphlets
discussing prevention of venereal disease and sexuality); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 559 (1980) (information concerning electricity
use).
101. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (preventing minors
from using tobacco products); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (protection of consumers
from deceptive sales practices); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 568-69
(energy conservation and fair utility rates); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447,
461 (1978) (prevention of fraud and undue influence in choice of legal representation).
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1. True (or Non-False) Speech
Most of the commercial speech cases considered by the Court
have involved content-based regulations directed at speech that was
true-or at least was not alleged to be materially false. Blanket
prohibitions on advertising birth control,'02 legal services, lm or the
price of liquor m4 are defined expressly in terms of the content of the
expression, and were we to treat them like other forms of
noncommercial expression instead of creating a special category
designated as "commercial," they would be subject to strict scrutiny.
1
0
The fact is, however, that notwithstanding the application of the more
flexible substantial interest test first articulated in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm'n.,m  most of the Court's
decisions-and in particular its most recent decisions-have
overturned the challenged regulations. Since the Court began to
grapple seriously with commercially motivated speech,m it has
decided at least thirty commercial speech cases.1 0 Twenty-two of
102. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
103. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
104. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484.
105. This, of course, assumes we don't retreat to the approach in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), which denied any First Amendment protection to
speech of a commercial nature.
106. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
107. The beginnings of serious efforts to address the relationship between commercial
speech and the First Amendment usually dates to the 1975-76 period with the decisions in
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) and Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For purposes of this article, I also include the 1973 decision
in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n. On Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
10& See Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); United States v.
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof 1 Regulation,
512 U.S. 136 (1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n. of Il., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Bd. of
Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Shapero v. Ky. State Bar,
486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 (1982);
Posadas de P.R. Assoc's. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 49 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc's. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85; Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809 (1975);
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these decisions struck down the challenged governmental
restriction,'O' while only eight upheld the government's regulation. " °
Of these eight decisions in favor of the government, three involved
the almost sui generis.1' field of professional advertising,"' leaving five
other decisions in which the Court has upheld commercial speech
regulations, 3 and the continuing viability of two of these cases is at
least subject to some question.114 Moreover, notwithstanding its talk
about granting government regulators more latitude with commercial
speech, the Court seems to be applying the Central Hudson standard
with a high degree of exactitude. 5 The point here is that most of the
Court's commercial speech cases would have come out the same way,
even if strict scrutiny were the standard.
But what about those cases where the Court has upheld
government regulation of commercial speech? Can they be reconciled
with an approach that does not categorically focus on the commercial
purpose of the underlying expression? This is a question worth asking
Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
109. See Thompson; United Foods; Lorillard Tobacco; Greater New Orleans Broad.; 44
Liquormart; Rubin; Ibanez; Edenfield; Discovery Network; Peel; Shapero; Bolger,
Zauderer, In re RMJ; Metromedia; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.; In re Primus; Bates;
Linmark, Carey; Va State Bd of Pharmacy; Bigelow.
110. See Glickman; Went For It, Edge Broadcasting; Fox; Posadas; Friedman; Ohralik;
Pittsburg Press.
111. See Kozinski and Banner, supra note 2, at 630
112. See Went For It, Friedman; Ohralik.
113. See Glickman; Edge Broad; Fox; Posadas; Pittsburg Press. Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), might also be read as implicitly upholding a commercial
speech regulation. Although the Court overturned a billboard ordinance, largely because
it favored commercial over noncommercial speech, the Justices were split on the rational
for doing so, and a majority would have sustained the ordinance in so far as it was directed
to purely commercial expression. Again, however, resort to the
commercial/noncommercial speech distinction was unnecessary. See infra note 119 and
accompanying text. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (1987) also presents an interesting classification issue. In upholding a
trademark statute designed to protect the Olympics name and symbolism, the Court
referred to the commercial limitations of the statute, but the case has broader
implications, as the underlying expression challenged in the case clearly was not purely
commercial, see id. at 535-36, and I do not include it. Like other decisions I discuss infra in
Part III.B., the case is better thought of as a variation on Zacchini v. Scripps Howard
Broad Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 532-33.
114. The Court's reasoning in Posadas was expressly rejected by a plurality in 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509-10, while Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which was joined
by three other Justices, conceded that the Court now examines commercial speech
regulation more searchingly than it did in Posadas. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 531-32. The
reasoning in Edge Broadcasting was at least implicitly called into question by Greater New
Orleans Broad Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
115. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J. concurring). See generally
BRODY AND JOHNSON, supra note 26, at chapter 6.
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because if a different approach would upend the results in a
substantial body of Supreme Court precedent, it would at least raise a
cautionary flag if not more.116 With only one likely exception,
however, First Amendment doctrine, apart from that developed
specifically for commercial speech, can appropriately accommodate
the kinds of cases in which the government has prevailed., All
involved circumstances where, for one or more of four reasons not
involving the categorization of speech as "commercial," the
government has been given broader latitude to regulate
notwithstanding the impact on expression.
First, consider Board of Trustees of the State University of N. Y. v.
Fox."7 That case upheld a restriction prohibiting solicitation in
dormitory rooms in New York State colleges. The Court addressed
the regulation using the Central Hudson standard, the key issue being
whether the test required that the regulator employ the least
restrictive means for accomplishing its aims or whether a more
flexible standard would apply. Resort to the Central Hudson test was
unnecessary, however. The case likely could just as easily have been
decided in exactly the same way by approaching it from the
perspective of traditional time, place, and manner regulation, which
employs standards that the Court recognized to be "substantially
similar"'18 to those used in the Central Hudson test. 9 In fact, because
some of the speech at issue in Fox arguably was not commercial, the
116. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) ("[S]tare decisis embodies
an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law .... But stare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision....").
117. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
118. Id. at 477; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001). It is
debatable whether in recent years the Court has applied the time, place, and manner
standard with the same rigor it has injected into its commercial speech decisions. Professor
William Van Alstyne has observed that time, place, and manner doctrine has been the
subject of an "increasingly intolerant... 'leveling down' trend." William Van Alstyne,
Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA
L. REv. 1635, 1646 (1996). Commercial speech doctrine, on the other hand, has of late
been applied "in an openhanded rather than grudging way to new factual patterns
addressed by the Court." BRODY AND JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 6-2.
119. Billboard regulation is another area that fits comfortably within time, place, and
manner regulation. In Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 490, a plurality of the Court suggested
that billboard restrictions or bans limited to purely commercial expression would be
sustained against First Amendment challenge. Id. at 507. The ordinance was overturned
on other grounds, however, but resort to the distinction was again unnecessary to promote
the kinds of interests asserted by the government. Indeed, in a later case, the Court
sustained a more content neutral sign ordinance by employing traditional time, place, and
manner analysis. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers of Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984).
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New York State university system advanced precisely such an
argument, contending that since "the dormitories are not a public
forum, and the restrictions constitute permissible 'time, place, and
manner' limitation the regulation should be sustained in any event.
'20
A second group of the Court's commercial speech cases may
fairly be characterized at least in part as not involving any serious
issue of general public concern. In a variety of contexts, the Court has
expressed the view that the First Amendment applies with particular
force to speech involving public issues, and where no such issue is
implicated, the latitude for regulation is greater.12 At least two of the
Court's decisions upholding commercial speech regulations appear to
have been animated at least in part by this consideration. In Friedman
v. Rogers,'2 the Court upheld a Texas statute prohibiting the practice
of optometry under a fictitious name, explaining that an optometrist
who seeks to use a trade name "does not wish to editorialize on any
subject, cultural, philosophical, or political" or "report any
particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations
even about commercial matters. ' 23 Similarly, in upholding a ban on
direct face to face solicitation of clients by lawyers, the Court
observed in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n124 that the appellant
lawyer in that case "does not contend, and on the facts of this case
could not contend, that his approaches to the two young women
involved political expression or an exercise of associational
freedom... ,,125
The third category of commercial speech cases where the Court
has upheld government regulation involves expression which, in
effect, aids and abets illegal activity. In Pittsburg Press Co. v.
120. 492 U.S. at 474. The Court declined to address this issue as it was unnecessary to
the decision and potentially involved additional legal and factual issues not addressed by
the Court of Appeals. Id
121. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59
(1985).
122. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
123. 440 U.S. at 11. The Court went on to point out that "[h]ere, we are concerned
with a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning." Id.
124. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
125. Id. at 458. In part because the solicitation in Ohralik involved a face to face
encounter, it also can be said that the speaker lacked "any strong interest in the free flow
of commercial information." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. In contrast is In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978), where the Court validated direct solicitation of an indigent woman by
an ACLU attorney where the purpose was to inform her of the right to sue for a
compelled sterilization. In distinguishing Ohralik, the Court emphasized that the
solicitation involved personal political beliefs and a desire to advance the ACLU's civil
liberties objectives.
20061
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,2 6 the Court upheld a
regulation prohibiting a newspaper from running gender specific help
wanted ads, and in doing so emphasized that "[d]iscrimination in
employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial
activity .... We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally
could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics
or soliciting prostitutes. ''
Indeed, quite apart from the commercial speech doctrine, courts
have rejected First Amendment challenges to convictions predicated
on expression designed to aid and abet criminal activity.
28
Finally, there are the cases where a speech restriction is
incidental to regulating non-speech related economic activity.' 9 The
cases fall into two categories-traditional regulation of professions
and other comprehensive economic regulatory schemes. Typical of
the former are the Court's decisions upholding restrictions on direct
client solicitation by lawyers.' 3 In regard to such professional
behavior, which has "traditionally been subject to extensive
regulation by the States," the Court has been willing to allow
somewhat more latitude in limiting attorney speech even where it
could not be characterized as commercial.131 Similarly, where a
126. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
127. Id. at 387. The Court has also mistakenly suggested that United States v. Edge
Broad Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), might fall into this class of cases as well. See 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996). Edge upheld provisions of the
Communications Act that prohibited a broadcaster from airing state lottery advertising if
the state in which it was located did not permit a lottery. It was true, as the Court pointed
out in 44 Liquormart, that the statute in Edge "was designed to regulate advertising about
an activity that had been deemed illegal in the jurisdiction in which the broadcaster was
located," but it was not at all clear that it would have been illegal for a resident of such a
state to purchase a lottery ticket in another state where it was legal. Thus, in this respect
Edge is unlike Pittsburg Press, where gender discrimination in employment was flatly
prohibited regardless of where it occurred, and is more analogous to Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975), where the conduct--abortion-was illegal in the state where it was
being advertised but legal in the state where the services would actually be provided.
12& See United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.); United
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978).
129. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 ("[t]he State's power to regulate commercial
transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech that is linked
inextricably to those transactions.").
130. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
131. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) ("the speech of
lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding
standard... [than that applicable to non-participants]"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966) ("collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the
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restriction is incidental to and necessary to promote a comprehensive
scheme of economic regulation, the Court has allowed broader
latitude without regard to whether the particular expression can be
categorized as commercial:
Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are
regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the
exchange of information about securities,... corporate proxy
statements.... the exchange of price and production information
among competitors, .. . and employers' threats of retaliation for the
labor activities of employees.... Each of these examples illustrates
that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial
activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity.
132
In these cases, speech is regulated in such a way that "there is no
realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."' 33 Thus,
for example, laws aimed at regulating proxy statements are aimed at
ensuring fair and effective corporate governance, not with
suppressing any particular views or devaluing any particular kind of
expression. This kind of regulation contrasts with paternalistic
restrictions of commercial speech that seek to promote some
objective unrelated to the underlying economic activity.1M
Furthermore, the potential for idea suppression is far greater and
consequently the degree of suspicion should be higher. 13 Of course,
difficult questions may arise as to where to draw the line in these
situations,' 36 but for purposes of this article, the important point is that
fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable .... ").
Thus, for example, a prior restraint may issue against an attorney participating in a case
under a lesser showing that would be required for a member of the press covering the
case. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
132. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S.
457, 470, 477 (1997) (upholding generic advertising order by Secretary of Agriculture
regardless of whether Central Hudson satisfied).
133. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
134. These cases fall into two categories. First, there are paternalistic regulations
which limit speech as a surrogate for direct regulation of some social condition. See Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Other regulations in this category assume that consumers will act irrationally if provided
with accurate information on a sensitive subject. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484. The
second category encompasses cases involving a wholesale devaluation of commercial
speech for reasons unrelated to the underlying need for regulation. See Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
135. Cf Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 384 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("For whether or not the Court should conceive
of exceptions to RA. V. 's general rule in a more practical way, no content-based statute
should survive even under a pragmatic recasting of R.A. V without a high probability that
no 'official suppression of ideas is afoot."').
136. To be sure, the Court has struggled at times to draw regulatory lines for speech
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the line drawing process does not need to involve the broad
categorization of expression as commercial or not.
Regardless of whether one agrees with how the Court has
decided its commercial speech cases, when they are reviewed in their
totality, I would suggest that there is only one case that simply cannot
be reconciled with an approach that does not involve the categorical
devaluation of commercial speech.: Valentine v. Chrestensen.'37 In
Valentine, the Court upheld the conviction of a resourceful promoter
of a submarine tour for violating a New York City anti-handbill
ordinance. The Court proceeded from the premise that commercial
speech was entitled to no protection at all, a view which has been
emphatically rejected in later decisions."" It is doubtful that the Court
would decide Valentine the same way today, even under the more
forgiving commercial speech standard of Central Hudson.
139
That the current body of Supreme Court case law can be
accommodated were we to reject the broad categorization of speech
as commercial does not fully demonstrate that such an approach is
prudent. The Court has been selective in the commercial speech cases
it has reviewed. Consequently, it is also important in evaluating
whether to jettison current doctrine to ask if whether doing so would
unduly restrict the ability of government to protect the public in areas
not yet addressed by the Court. On its broadest level, that question
presents so many possible permutations and combinations as to make
a complete analysis almost impossible. Nevertheless, it is at least
associated with economic activity. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of
P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 334 (1986) ( suggesting that power to regulate gambling necessarily
includes ancillary power to regulate associated advertising) and United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding restriction on state lottery advertising)
with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509 (1996) (striking down restriction on liquor advertising
and rejecting the reasoning of Posadas) and Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (striking down restriction on advertising gambling
activities). In 44 Liquormart, the Court suggested one limiting principle: "the State retains
less regulatory authority when its... restrictions strike at the substance of the information
communicated rather than the commercial aspect...." 517 U.S. at 499 (quoting Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)).
137. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
13& See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 758-62 (1976).
139. The Court has been particularly hostile to blanket bans on expression like that in
Valentine. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977) (blanket ban on
lawyer advertising); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (ban on
contraceptive advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92-92 (1977) (ban
on "For Sale" signs). Nor has it permitted excessive weight to be placed on the
commercial/noncommercial distinction. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410,426-28 (1993).
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worth examining. Consider, for example, a recent federal regulation
of speech which I suspect most people would applaud and which
arguably may be more difficult to sustain in the absence of current
commercial speech jurisprudence: the implementation by the Federal
Trade Commission of a nationwide do not call list prohibiting
uninvited telephone solicitation of those who place their names on a
national register.
I characterize the Do Not Call register as a difficult case because
at least viscerally, the Commission's action seems reasonable,
prohibiting an unwanted intrusion into the home, and carefully
calibrated to serve that interest by applying only to those who
affirmatively choose to opt in by placing their name on the list. The
FTC's restriction, moreover, applies only to one method of
speaking-direct telephone solicitation-and thus has much in
common with the kinds of time, place and manner restrictions that
the Court has suggested would be upheld under the more flexible
substantial interest form of review.14°
What is troublesome about the Do Not Call list from a First
Amendment perspective is that the regulatory scheme is not entirely
content neutral; it applies only to commercial solicitations, exempting
calls for charitable or political purposes. 14 This feature of the law
would seem to disqualify it from treatment as a mere restriction on
the manner of speech, 4 although as discussed below, a particular
feature of the FTC's limited jurisdiction may supply a neutral basis
for the distinction.
1 43
The FTC regulation does not seem particularly difficult to justify
when judged under the Central Hudson test currently applicable to
commercial speech and, in fact, was upheld on those grounds by the
Tenth Circuit in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission.144 It is less clear that in its present form the Do Not Call
register could withstand strict scrutiny analysis.
140. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
141. The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Protection Act of 1994 defines
"telemarketing" as calls "conducted to induce purchases of goods and services." 15 U.S.C.
§ 6106 (4) (2000).
142. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-29 (1993). But
see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
536-37 (1987) (suggesting that a statute prohibiting use of word "Olympic" in trade or
advertising was a restriction on manner of speech.).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57.
144. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004)
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In a similar context, the Supreme Court has struck down, in a
variety of contexts, local regulators' attempts to restrict all in person,
door-to-door solicitation of the home. 45 At the same time, the Court
has cited with approval the concept of consumer opt in schemes as a
potentially less restrictive way of regulating offensive door-to-door
solicitation, but in these cases the Court appeared to be envisioning
content neutral regulatory schemes; that is, regulations that allowed
residents to forbid door-to-door solicitation regardless of its
purpose.'4 It is not obvious from a First Amendment perspective why
the FTC should be permitted to discriminate among speakers doing
effectively the same thing as was done in the in-person solicitation
cases solely on the basis of what they have to say.147 As the Tenth
Circuit recognized, it is true that the evidence before the Commission
was that most of the problems with telephone solicitation involved
commercial calls and that people tended to find these kinds of
solicitations more offensive. 48 Perhaps this evidence, when coupled
with the interest in minimizing invasions of privacy into the home 49
would be enough to sustain the rule even if strictly scrutinized. Indeed
there would be something ironic about striking down the law because
145. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, (2002); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The Court has not been entirely
consistent in its treatment of restrictions on door-to-door solicitation. In Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited
commercial solicitation. That challenge was brought by magazine solicitor and, thus,
involved a category of speech usually associated with full First Amendment protection. To
the extent the Court was animated by a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial forms of solicitation, it is enough to note that it was decided in 1951, well
before commercial speech was recognized to fall within the protective ambit of the First
Amendment. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. To the extent that commercial
concerns were not at work, considerable tension exists between Breard, on the one hand,
and Martin, which the Breard Court distinguished but did not overrule, id. at 642-43, and
subsequent cases such as Watchtower Bible and Village of Schaumburg, on the other hand,
which take a dim view of restrictions on in-person solicitation.
146. See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 153, 168-69; Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at
639; Martin, 319 U.S. at 147-49.
147. In Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the Court upheld a
postal service regulation requiring the removal of the names from mailing lists at the
request of the recipient of any advertising offering for sale matter that the recipients, in
sole discretion, believed to be erotic or sexually provocative. See id. at 730. Although the
regulation defined its reach in terms of the content of the expression, the Court appeared
to view the virtually absolute discretion vested in the mail recipient as removing any
element of content based classification by the government. See id. at 737.
148. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240-41.
149. See. e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("[t]he State's interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest
order .... ) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,471 (1980)).
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it did not restrict enough speech, 5° and the Supreme Court has been
generally unimpressed by claims that speech restrictions are
underinclusive.151
Nevertheless, it is troubling that the current content-centric
structure of the Do Not Call register may be unnecessary. Just as it
offered consumers the option of restricting commercial calls on either
a general or a company specific basis, the FTC could be permitted to
offer the option of restricting all unsolicited calls or only those which
are commercial. It has not done so at least in part due to limits on its
jurisdiction, which does not extend to nonprofit entities.152 This
jurisdictional limitation was recently cited by a divided Fourth Circuit
panel as supplying a content-neutral basis justifying a distinction
drawn by FTC regulations governing for profit, but not nonprofit,
charitable telephone solicitors.'53 The panel's reasoning is not without
appeal and could help to explain why the commercial telemarketing
regulations should be upheld under the more flexible standards
applicable to content neutral regulation. Yet an opinion dissenting
from the panel's decision highlights a potential flaw in its reasoning:
The implications of this holding are staggering. If a regulation that
places different restrictions on speech based upon the identity of
the speaker can be upheld simply by relying on the jurisdiction of
the agency, as the "neutral justification" for the distinction, this
court will have created a perverse incentive for all legislative
bodies. Congress can restrict speech, even unconstitutionally, so
long as it does so by parsing jurisdiction between variousagencies. 1
At least a partial answer to this point is that such jurisdictional
limitations will withstand First Amendment scrutiny only if they are
animated by concerns unrelated to expression or the identity of
150. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238-39 (stating that "underinclusiveness... is
relevant only if it renders the regulatory framework so irrational that it fails materially to
advance the aims that it was purportedly designed to further.").
151. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U. S. 418,434 (1993).
152 See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 420 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir.
2005). The Commission regulates telemarketing calls pursuant to two different statutes.
Commercial telemarketing calls-those designed to induce the sale of goods and
services-are regulated pursuant to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act of 1994. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2004). In
2001, the definition of "telemarketing" was expanded by the Patriot Act to include calls
regarding "a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other thing of
value .... See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 338. As recognized by the Fourth
Circuit, neither of these statutes altered the Commission's limited jurisdiction. Id at 335-
338.
153. Nat'l Fedn' of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 335.
154. Id. at 354.
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particular classes of speakers.' Since a general jurisdictional grant
limited to for profit companies does not seem to implicate any
important interests protected by the First Amendment, the
Commission's decision to regulate only telemarketers within its
jurisdiction may be justifiable by reference to a more flexible
standard of review.1-6 What would not be permitted without
substantially more justification is any attempt by the Commission to
disfavor particular genres of expression or particular speakers within
its purview.'57
155. Such an approach would distinguish the principal example used by the dissent
which involved a hypothetical division of jurisdiction over political parties so that one
party was subject to more onerous regulation than the other. As identically situated
entities, it would be difficult to advance a persuasive, neutral reason for treating political
parties differently. Cf Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking
down regulation of news racks on the grounds that they were similarly situated in terms of
the government interest being served). On the other hand, nonprofit entities generally
operate in a different sphere from profit making ventures. Of course, if it appeared that a
seemingly neutral distinction was being used to punish or disadvantage a particular class of
speakers, a different result would obtain. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
156. There remain at least two problems with using the Fourth Circuit's reasoning to
support more flexible review of FI'C telemarketing regulations. First, the underlying
statutes themselves may be content based and when taken together may disfavor certain
categories of expression (sale of goods and services and chartable solicitations) while
leaving others completely alone. Second, the Commission's own telemarketing rules treat
for-profit charitable telemarketers differently from other commercial telemarketers, see
Nat'l Fed'n for the Blind, 420 F.3d at 338, a distinction that seems difficult to justify in a
world where commercial speech is not categorically devalued. Indeed, without substantial
evidence demonstrating that for-profit charitable callers are less intrusive than commercial
telemarketers, it is doubtful even under the current regime that such different treatment
could be sustained. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424.
157. Professor William Van Alstyne has identified one potentially troubling
consequence of equating commercial and noncommercial speech in the context of using
public or quasi-public facilities. See Van Alstyne, supra note 118, at 1635. Such parity, Van
Alstyne warns, might compel regulators more broadly to restrict the use of facilities for
expression if they can no longer distinguish commercial from noncommercial uses. A
particularly powerful example is news rack regulation, which was the subject of Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. at 410 (1993), a decision which overturned a restriction on news racks
used to distribute commercial speech. If local governments can no longer make such a
distinction, Van Alstyne posits, they may well seek to control the proliferation of such
devices by prohibiting all of them, an approach which a number of Justices have suggested
would be permissible. See Van Alstyne, supra note 118, at 1640-43. Van Alstyne's point
has considerable force, particularly in a legal environment which he recognizes has
granted government more latitude in restricting the use of public forums. See id. at 1646.
At the risk of diminishing the very real concerns posited by Professor Van
Alstyne, there are at least two possible responses to his point. First, the central problem
here lies not with the leveling up of constitutional protection for commercial speech, but in
the leveling down of the degree of protection offered to those using public facilities to
express themselves. In other words, the latter phenomenon has occurred separately from
the former, and the real solution is not in diminishing one kind of expression, but in
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2. False or Misleading Speech
With restrictions on false or misleading speech, the Court has
recognized that the interests of government in regulating are more
consistent with the stated rationale for offering commercial speech
less protection than other kinds of speech:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers
from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices .... the
purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according
constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore
justifies less than strict review.
158
The notion that greater latitude should be accorded to prevent
deception isn't limited to commercial speech; as I discussed earlier,
greater First Amendment latitude has been permitted in restricting
false speech in a variety of contexts, not just where it is commercially
motivated.159 The central question in these cases is how much
"breathing space" is required to make sure that a speaker will not be
unduly deterred by the fear of liability.
The most common kinds of regulations involving false
commercial speech are false advertising laws. Although they come in
all shapes and sizes,16 many have in common that they often impose
liability strictly.16 ' Few would argue that government interests in
prohibiting false advertising would not qualify as sufficiently weighty
to support some regulation. The questions are how much and under
what circumstances? Do the competing interests at stake justify a
strict liability approach? If so, should run of the mill product or
validating all kinds. Second, it is not entirely clear that where there was a real need to limit
access to public facilities choices could not be made that facilitated access in ways that
served the broadest possible dissemination of information. For example, were there truly a
need to limit the number of news racks in a particular location, a regulator might indeed
grant favored access to the kinds of publications likely to disseminate the broadest range
of information-in other words general circulation newspapers. As Professor David
Anderson has recognized in arguing for a limited reading of the Press Clause of the First
Amendment, the statue books are filled with laws discriminating in favor of the news
media by granting preferential access where limits are required. See David A. Anderson,
Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429,435-45 (2002). The White House press pool is a
classic example.
158. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,501 (1996).
159. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
160. On the federal level, Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and
sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52(b), provide
various rights of action, both private and governmental, against false or deceptive
advertising. See generally KENNETH A. PLEVAN AND MIRIAM L. SIROKY, ADVERTISING
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, Chapters 1, 6 (2d ed. 1991). All fifty states also have laws
regulating false advertising. See generally id., Chapter 11; BRODY & JOHNSON, supra note
26, § 10:5.2.
161. See generally BRODY & JOHNSON, supra note 26, §§ 9:3, 10:5.2.
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service ads be treated the same as the letter to the editor at the center
of the Nike case?1 62 The seeds of an answer, I believe, may be found in
some of the Court's defamation cases.
In the defamation context, the Court has prescribed minimum
fault requirements that limit states' ability to provide a remedy in
most instances. At the risk of oversimplifying, public figures
ordinarily must prove a publisher acted with actual malice while
private figure defamation plaintiffs need only prove negligence, at
least as a constitutional matter.' 3 Since it began addressing this area,
the Court has never expressly approved strict liability in any
defamation case, although in one instance it has strongly implied that
there is room for such an approach in the category of cases where no
issue of public concern is involved. That case, Dun & Bradsteet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,' 64 arose out of a false credit report, and it
may present a useful framework for how to deal with false advertising
cases.
The credit report in Dun & Bradstreet, although commercially
motivated, was not the kind of speech that fit comfortably into the
class of cases comprising the commercial speech jurisprudence. Yet
the Court was clearly influenced by many of the same factors that
often underlie that body of decisions. As in earlier defamation cases,
the central issue in Dun & Bradstreet involved deciding the proper
accommodation for the competing interests. The state's interest in
compensating individuals for damage to reputation was the same in
Dun & Bradstreet as it is in other cases. What differed was the First
Amendment interest which the Court viewed as "less important"
because the credit report did not, in its estimation, involve speech
implicating an issue of general public concern which is "at the heart of
the First Amendment's protection. ' '6 Whether speech involves a
matter of public concern is to be determined by the "content, form
and context" of the expression, and the Court emphasized three
162. In a recent article, Bruce Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher make a convincing argument
that within the context of the commercial speech doctrine, such distinctions should be
based on format-traditional forms of advertising would receive less protection than more
creative forms. See Bruce E. H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content is
the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1243 (2004). While
Johnson's and Fisher's approach would represent an improvement over the current
approach, it doesn't fully address the problem of devaluing important messages that are
often contained within even traditional forms of promotion.
163. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
164. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
165. Id at 758-59.
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principal considerations in determining that the credit report in Dun
& Bradstreet did not.166
First was the fact that the "speech [was] solely in the individual
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience."'1 67 Second,
because it was made available to only a few subscribers, "it cannot be
said that the report involves any strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information."' 68 Third, "the speech here, like advertising
is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation"
because it was "solely motivated by the desire for profit."' 69 The
Court also suggested that the credit report "arguably" was more
objectively verifiable,7 but it did not appear to rely much on this
factor and with good reason; the information in the credit report in
the case and how the defendant obtained it really did not differ in any
material way from how the news media obtained information in those
defamation cases mandating a more rigorous level of First
Amendment scrutiny.
171
While Dun & Bradstreet is perhaps not a model of clarity, the
Court's reasoning does focus on factors that are relevant to the First
Amendment inquiry unlike some of the commercial speech
jurisprudence. And if it is applied with sensitivity to underlying First
Amendment values, it offers a useful way to approach the false
advertising genre.
In most false advertising cases it may also be said that the
expression is solely in the interest of the speaker and its business
audience. Product and service advertising is designed specifically to
reach an audience of likely buyers for the benefit of the advertiser. It
is also durable speech; advertising is a necessary component of the
166. One danger in a standard based on notions of public concern is that it could prove
so malleable and amorphous as to undermine First Amendment values. See Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78-79 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23.5 at 3-86-87 (2005). It is,
thus, important that any such standard be interpreted in the kind of "spacious" way that
promotes robust expression. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
135 (1992). At least in the area of defamation, where the concept is central to determining
how much First Amendment protection is afforded, courts have largely avoided too
cramped a view. See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND
RELATED PROBLEMS § 6.6 at 6-25 (3rd ed. 2005).
167. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 762-63.
171. The information at issue in Dun & Bradstreet was gathered by an employee's
review of public records-4n this case bankruptcy filings. Id. at 752. This is precisely how
the news media frequently obtains information on a variety of subjects.
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sales process and is less likely to be deterred than more optional
forms of speech.1" The difficulty in translating Dun & Bradstreet to
the typical advertising context lies in the consideration of the free
flow of commercial information. In this respect, advertising differs
from Dun & Bradstreet's credit report. Advertising is ordinarily
disseminated to a wide audience, at least compared to the five
recipients of the Dun & Bradstreet credit report. '73 If we accept the
notion that advertising is not to be categorically devalued merely
because it concerns matters of commercial interest, then the Dun &
Bradstreet methodology does not exactly fit.
There is, however, a characteristic of most product or service
advertising which differs from the interests implicated by the credit
report and which may justify treating the two in the same way. That
difference has to do with verifiability, one of the traditional lynchpins
of the commercial speech doctrine, and it helps explain both why
ordinary product or service ads may be regulated without undue First
Amendment concerns as well as why these kinds of ads should be
treated differently from the kind of expression involved in Nike and
its ilk which has created difficulty in the application of the
commercial speech doctrine.
When a false advertising complaint challenges specific claims
made about the price, quality or other particular characteristics of a
speaker's product or service, the complaint involves both matters
which are likely to be verifiable, and may fairly be said to be
especially within the sphere of the advertiser's knowledge. In the
context of accommodating the respective First Amendment interests
in evaluating a restriction on false speech, these factors are relevant
as the kind of normative considerations that have influenced the
standard of liability in other areas, particularly defamation. Just as the
Court has held it relevant that a public figure is less in need and less
deserving of protection from false statements, 174 so too can it be said
that an advertiser is less in need and less deserving of protection from
specific claims it makes about its own products or services. Where
claims involve matters not within the speaker's particular sphere of
172 See generally David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REv. 1203, 1218-19 ("With every newspaper
edition, television news broadcast or internet website, editors and producers face a wide
range of daily choices about what to include or exclude, and without much notice might
well tend to avoid reporting that which is likely to bring with it potential exposure to
significant liability or defense costs.").
173. See Dun & Bradstreet, 422 U.S. at 751.
174. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
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knowledge, the interests would balance differently, leading to a
different conclusion. 75
To see how these various interests play out in the commercial
speech context, consider the Nike case and a variation on it. Although
the claim against Nike arose out of a variety of communications, it
revolved around the company's response to claims that it treated its
Asian workers poorly. In letters to the editor, editorial
advertisements and other communications, Nike responded to its
critics' charges by detailing some of the benefits it extended to its
workers and characterizing its practices, 176 arguing that it was "doing a
good job"'7' and "operating morally."1 7  Under the approach I
propose, these kinds of statements would not subject Nike to strict
liability for two reasons.
First, they were made in a context where they cannot be said to
be solely in the interest of the speaker and its business audience. To
the contrary, the kind of speech in which Nike engaged was part of a
broader public debate, not only over its particular labor practices,'79
but that of the apparel industry in general, 8° and as such is of interest
to a far broader audience. 8' Louis Brandeis's famous admonition that
"the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones ' is particularly
relevant here. Issues like that implicated in Nike generate
considerable public debate which ensures that all sides of the issue
are ventilated.I 3
Second, the claims against Nike didn't relate to the particular
characteristics of goods or services, and most of what Nike said
175. For example, the justifications for diminished protection likely would not apply to
defamation actions arising from claims by one competitor about another's products or
service. See BRODY & JOHNSON, supra note 26 §§ 7.3.3, 7.3.4.
176. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243,248 (Cal. 2002).
177. Id.
17& Id.
179. See Johnson & Fisher, supra note 12, at 1245-49.
180. See, e.g., MSNBC.com, Sweatshop Journal (1998), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/Onair/NBC/dateline/time.asp; CNN Interactive, Four chains
bought from sweatshops that exploit workers (1997), available at
http://www.cnn.com/05/97/12/14/sweatshop.retailers/.
181. Indeed, the complainant in Nike, Mark Kasky, did not even claim to be a
consumer of Nike products and alleged no injury as a result of Nike's communications. See
Nike, 45 P.3d at 243. The absence of any actual reliance or injury was the basis for the
Solicitor General's argument that his claim should be rejected on First Amendment
grounds. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), at 25-32, available at 2003 WL 899100 at *21-*26.
182. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
183. See generally Johnson & Fisher, supra note 12, at 1245-49 (describing the public
debate surrounding Nike's statements).
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involved the company's characterization of its labor practices,
implicating the kinds of value judgments that can hardly be said to be
particularly subject to objective verification. Outside of the
commercial speech realm, such loose, figurative statements are
ordinarily not subject to liability under any circumstances, '84 much less
a standard which imposes sanctions strictly.
Contrast the facts in Nike with the case where the company
makes specific representations in an advertisement about the quality
or characteristics of its footwear; for example, a claim that a particular
brand of athletic shoe has more cushioning than other brands which
leads to fewer impact injuries. Such a claim is likely to be of more
limited interest only to those people interested in buying or using
Nike products who may lack the sophistication or information
necessary to make an informed decision.' 8' Second, it is durable; Nike
needs to make such claims in advertising in order to prosper in the
competitive and fickle athletic footwear market.' 6 And finally, the
claim is subject to the kind of proof that is likely to be within Nike's
particular control. Thus, if false or deceptive, a regulation imposing
strict liability should not meet with any constitutional impediment.'"
The approach I am advocating largely avoids the kinds of
troubling classification problems that arise in cases like Nike and
Bolger v. Young Drug Products.l88 Bolger involved a statute that
prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives. That the statute was struck down by a unanimous
184. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
185. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191,200 (1982).
186. See, e.g., Chris M. Abess, The Footwear Industry: Stepping into the Future
(2004), http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/data/Deloitte %20Article.pdf.
187. A somewhat closer case than Nike is Egg Nutrition v. Federal Trade Conmission,
570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978), which was one of the
examples used by Kozinski and Banner to demonstrate the futility of making broad
categorical distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech. That case arose
out of an FTC complaint challenging claims made by an egg industry group that there was
no scientific link between egg consumption and heart disease. The Commission
determined the claim to be false and misleading. I characterize the case as closer than Nike
because the specific claims made did, in fact, concern the particular characteristics of the
promoter's product. However one may choose to characterize the verifiability inquiry in
regard to that claim, it seems to me that the presence of a broader issue of public
concern-whether egg consumption is harmful to one's health-would militate in favor of
extending full protection to the expression, as it cannot be said that it was solely in the
interest of the speaker and its business audience. I concede, however, that the potential
malleability of the public concern inquiry could inject some doubt into close questions
presented by cases like Egg Nutrition.
188. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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Court is unremarkable; the law in question broadly prohibited any
speech on an important public issue for reasons that were almost
entirely paternalistic.1 89 What is troubling about Bolger is the
implications of how the Court reached its decision. Much of the
expression at issue in Bolger was in the form of informational
pamphlets distributed by a condom manufacturer discussing the
desirability of prophylactics.' 90 Despite recognizing that these
pamphlets did not fit comfortably into its commercial speech model,
as they could not be characterized as mere proposals for a
commercial transaction, the Court nevertheless felt constrained to
categorize them one way or the other as either commercial or not,
notwithstanding that much of what they addressed involved
important public health issues of widespread concern. It did so,
moreover, in a way that established no meaningful standards and
emphasized considerations largely divorced from what should be the
overriding concerns. The Court found the pamphlets to be
commercial for reasons having little to do either with promoting
widespread public debate or protecting consumers, holding that the
combination of the pamphlets being "advertisements," referring in
places to specific products and being motivated by economic
considerations meant they were "commercial. '"' 91
The need to cram the speech involved in Bolger into a one-size-
fits-all commercial speech box leads to pernicious results. As
illustrated by that case, speech in the real world often cannot be
neatly categorized. Commercial and noncommercial elements may be
inextricably intertwined, and as Kozinski and Banner recognized,
speakers will employ constantly shifting and ever more creative
means for disseminating their messages. 9' An approach that seeks to
encompass all of these diverse means of expression within a single
construct will necessarily be so vague and malleable as to provide no
meaningful guidance and allow the kind of relativistic, results-
oriented decision-making that the First Amendment should
prevent.1 ' Consequently, public debate on important issues may be
189. Id. at 71-74. The Court has almost uniformly struck down this kind of
paternalistic regulation. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-
05.
190. See 463 U.S. at 62.
191. Id at 66-67.
192. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 645.
193. Cf Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785-87
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing how lack of
clear standards results in subordination of long-term speech values to the "inequities of
the moment," ad hoc balancing with its resulting confusion and lack of judicial discipline,
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skewed as companies seek to avoid the risks associated with potential
lawsuits by constricting their comments. 94 The First Amendment, of
course, presupposes precisely the opposite-that the public welfare is
best served by ventilation of "information from diverse and
antagonistic sources ....",9
The speech in Bolger could just as easily and far more sensitively
been dealt with by the kind of interest based analysis discussed
above.16 Bolger, of course, involved no claims that the expression was
deceptive and, thus, under the approach I am proposing would have
been subject to strict scrutiny.197 But what if the Bolger pamphlets had
been challenged as being deceptive? Would an interest based
approach provide sufficient regulatory flexibility? I believe it would.
The latitude accorded to the government in such a case would
depend on what was being challenged. Where charges of deception
arose from specific claims made about the quality or characteristics of
Young's products, few impediments would exist to regulation. Where
they involved more general or widespread concerns-say, for
example, the importance of condom use in preventing the spread of
the HIV virus-the standard for liability would, at a minimum, be
significantly higher.
My purpose here is not to address every possible variation that
might arise. The point is that First Amendment doctrine relating to
the regulation of false speech is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
legitimate commercial regulatory concerns without resorting to the
creation of a separate one size fits all category for commercial speech.
A more constitutionally sensitive interest based approach, moreover,
and the lack of notice and fair warning to those who must predict how courts will respond
to attempts to suppress their speech).
194. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n. 21 (1978)
("[c]orporate management would not be willing to risk [those penalties] .... In addition,
the burden and expense of litigating the issue. . . would unduly impinge of the exercise of
the constitutional right."). After the California Supreme Court's decision in Nike,
companies were advised that "[u]nless and until the U.S. Supreme Court reviews
Kasky... [tihe safest course may be to make no reference at all to one's products,
services, or business operations-but that may amount to saying nothing at all when one's
industry is under general attack." Jonathan A. Loeb & Jeffrey A. Sklar, Be Careful When
Your Company Speaks, AGS&K BUSINESS REPORT, available at
http://www.alschuler.com/showarticle.aspx?=Showl5 (visited Oct. 23, 2002); see Richard
0. Faulk, A Chill Wind Blows: California's Supreme Court Muzzles Corporate Speech, 16
No. 21 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 11 (2002); Roger Parloff, Can We Talk? A
Shocking First Amendment Ruling Against Nike Radically Reduces the Rights of
Corporations to Speak Their Minds, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 102.
195. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
196. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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is likely to facilitate the kinds of open debate and dissemination of
important commercial information that the First Amendment should
protect.
B. Rethinking the Right of Publicity
The Right of Publicity protects an individual's right to control
selected attributes of identity in certain circumstances. 18 As a
creature of state law, the precise contours of the right vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in most places it is limited to
commercial uses, which are generally defined as those involving tradeS• 199
or advertising. Commercial uses for right of publicity purposes are
not necessarily coextensive with "commercial speech" as defined by
the Supreme Court." Many right of publicity cases do, of course,
involve purely commercial uses of identity in advertising or
promotion,21 but in some places the right of publicity extends to
things like sculptures, t-shirts and trading cards 10 or mixed speech
products, and informational expression with a promotional
component, what I define as mixed message speech. 23 Both involve
198. The right of publicity is generally recognized to have been derived from the
seminal article on privacy by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren. Louis D. Brandeis &
Samuel D. Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195-97 (1890). Some
jurisdictions still recognize a distinction between the right of publicity and a right of
privacy against misappropriation of one's identity. A cause of action for the appropriation
of name and likeness is intended to protect the dignitary interest of the plaintiff. A cause
of action for a violation of the right of publicity is intended to protect the commercial
interest of the plaintiff. See Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28.6 (4th ed. 2003). I refer to the right of publicity as encompassing both,
and differences will be discussed only where relevant to the subject matter being
addressed.
199. See generally Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present and Future,
1207 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 159(2000).
200. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 (9th Cir.
2001); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001).
201. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir.
1992); Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2001); Allen v. National
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
202. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959,
967-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (trading cards); Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 811 (T-shirts);
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc., v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296
S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. 1982) (sculpture).
203. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2001)
(promotional brochure one quarter of which was devoted to stories, news and other
editorial features); O'Grady v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 5:02 CV173, 2003
WL 24174616 (E.D. Tex. December 19, 2003) (interstitial programming about soon to be
released movie aired during documentary that inspired film).
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genres of expression going beyond pure advertising that don't fit
neatly into current notions of commercial speech.24
In most right of publicity cases involving traditional forms of
advertising and promotion, constitutional validity has been largely
assumed. Very few of these decisions contain any meaningful
discussion of the First Amendment implications of the right of
publicity, and those that do dismiss constitutional arguments on the
basis that because commercial speech is a lower form of expression,
the First Amendment is no impediment to recovery.25
The law involving right of publicity claims directed at expression
that can't easily be categorized as purely commercial is chaotic,
perhaps due in part to the fact that the Supreme Court has addressed
the relationship between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment only once, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co.20 That decision arose out of unusual facts involving a carnival act
by Hugo Zacchini, who billed himself as the "Human Cannonball."
As his moniker suggested, Mr. Zacchini's act involved shooting him
out of a cannon into a net some distance away." Over his objection, a
local television station recorded and broadcast on the evening news
the entirety of Zacchini's performance 0 9 He sued for a violation of
his right of publicity.
Although the precise boundaries of its opinion are uncertain, as
the Court didn't set forth any generally applicable rule of decision for
similar cases, it is clear that Zacchini does not immunize all or even
most right of publicity cases from First Amendment challenge. 21' To
the contrary, the Court emphasized the unusual nature of the facts
presented, involving the appropriation of an entire performance, and
made clear that it was dealing with a peculiarly compelling form of
misappropriation:
204. See Volokh, supra note 46, at 907.
205. See White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
206. See infra note 236.
207. 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
20& Id. at 563.
209. Id. at 564.
210. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §8:27
(2d ed. 2005) ("while the Zacchini majority and dissenting opinions have been picked
apart word for word by the commentators, no clear message emerges and no general rule
is discemable by which to predict the result of conflicts between the right of publicity and
the First Amendment.").
211. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 956 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing
Zacchini as "narrowly drawn"); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing Zacchini as a "red herring").
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[t]he case before us is more limited than the broad category of
lawsuits that may arise under the heading of 'appropriation.'
Petitioner does not merely assert that some general use, such as
advertising, was made of his name and likeness; he relies on the
much narrower claim that respondent televised an entire act that he
ordinarily gets paid to perform.
2 12
The Court's reasoning was predicated on two related interests
that were present on these facts but which may not be nearly so
compelling in many right of publicity cases. First, the particular wrong
"vitally affects his [Zacchini's] livelihood ... and presents a
"substantial threat to the economic value of that performance., 214
Second, drawing an analogy to copyright and patent law, the Court
emphasized that the right of publicity as applied in the case "provides
an economic incentive for [Zacchini] to make the investment required
to produce a performance ... .,""' These interests, the Court
recognized, were "unlike the unauthorized use of another's name for
purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the
press" and presented the "strongest case for a 'right of publicity'
involving not the appropriation of an entertainers reputation to
enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product but the
appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired
his reputation in the first place.,
216
Zacchini is best viewed not as a run of the mill right of publicity
case at all- at least as right of publicity has come to be understood-
but as a form of that narrow category of misappropriation recognized
by the Court in International New Service v. Associated Press217 which
is designed to protect against unjust enrichment as the result of one's
free-riding on the work of another. That case involved the lifting of
factual news stories from AP bulletins by a competing news service.
Since the information appropriated was purely factual, it was not
subject to copyright protection, but the Court nonetheless recognized
a remedy for the misappropriation. Although the precise boundaries
of Associated Press are unclear,2 8 the Supreme Court, and lower
courts that have since recognized similar kinds of claims, have
suggested two central factors. First, the misappropriation must be of
the sort that threatens serious harm by direct competition to the
212. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574, n.10.
213. Id. at 572, n.9.
214. Id. at 575.
215. Id. at 576.
216. Id.
217. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
21& See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997).
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plaintiff in a primary market. 9 Second, the misappropriation must
"so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its
existence or quality would be substantially threatened."
' 'm
Such an interpretation of Zacchini not only comports with its
expressed limitations but also is most consistent with current First
Amendment jurisprudence. The right of publicity is, of course, a
content-based law; its coverage is defined precisely in terms of the
subject matter of the speech it seeks to restrict.22' As discussed earlier
in this article, unless subject to some exception to the general rule
(for example, the commercial speech doctrine), such content-based
restrictions will be sustained only under circumstances sufficient to
withstand a high degree of scrutiny m
The interests served by more common right of publicity cases
often do not implicate the kinds of compelling concerns central to
Zacchini. The right of publicity is designed primarily to compensate
individuals for the infringement of the commercial value of certain
attributes of their identity. 23 However, the value that one seeks to
derive from a use of their identity may not arise so directly from the
kinds of weighty considerations at work in Zacchini:
The commercial value of a person's identity often results from
success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their
own substantial rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to
the right of publicity may have only marginal significance. In other
cases the commercial value acquired by a person's identity is largely
fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the
individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property and unjust
enrichment rationales for protection.
219. See Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 240-41; Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 852;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §38, cnut. C, at 412-13.
220. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 852; see Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 240-41.
221. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). Moreover, as a law aimed purely
at speech, the right of publicity should be subject to exacting scrutiny. See Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001).
222. See supra Part III.A.1.
223. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 47
(1995).
224. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915, 930 (6th Cir. 2003). In other words,
the direct rewards of being a professional athlete or actor-fame, the thrill of
compensation, direct lucrative compensation-provide enough incentive. See Cardtoons.
LLC v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,973 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The
incentive effect of publicity rights, however, has been overstated."); Volokh, supra note
46, at 910 ("It's hard to believe that people would stop wanting to become political
leaders, actors, or athletes if they were told that they would get less income from sales of
T-shirts or prints.").
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Additionally, in some contexts, the right of publicity is said to
serve the interest of redressing the humiliation or hurt feelings that
can result from an unauthorized use of identity.22 To the extent that
right of publicity seeks to compensate for such generalized
humiliation or distress, without any requirement that falsity be
demonstrated, it would seem to be in conflict with cases like Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell.
Absent the kind of interests that animated Zacchini, the question
then becomes whether a broader application of the right of publicity
may be justified based on the commercial character of expression. I
believe the answer is no. Indeed, even if one adheres to the basic
notion that commercial speech is categorically less valuable, it is
questionable whether the kinds of economic interests underlying
publicity law would support a broad application of the right.
In Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.2- the Court recognized
that in order to sustain a restriction treating commercial and other
kinds of speech differently, the government interests that underlie the
restriction must at least have some relevance to the distinction being
made.m Even if one were to accept the commercial speech doctrine in
its current form, the right of publicity simply doesn't comport with
this principle. First, to the extent individuals have an interest in being
compensated for use of their identity, that interest is unrelated to any
distinction between commercial and other kinds of speech, as the
interest of the party seeking recovery would be equally present
whether or not the underlying appropriation was for advertising or
for some other kind of commercial exploitation which did not involve
commercial speech.229 Tiger Woods, for example, would have had the
225. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enterprises v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
226. 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that First Amendment considerations override
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising from parody); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that First Amendment interests in reporting truthful
information outweigh privacy interests). These decisions didn't involve commercial
speech, but if one doesn't categorically devalue that genre of expression, the principles
should have application to advertising uses unless outweighed by some other
consideration.
227. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
228. Id. at 424 ("Not only does Cincinnati's categorical ban on commercial news racks
place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech, but in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular
interests that the city has asserted.") (emphasis in original).
229. It is also worth noting that the interest of the individual to control and profit from
use of his identity is quite different from the kinds of consumer protection interests that
have animated the commercial speech doctrine. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) ("When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
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same general interest in being compensated for use of his image in a
print2 as he would for use of it in a television commercial. Second,
and more important, the interests that most commonly have been
offered to support different treatment of commercial speech from
other speech-durability and verifiability-have little if anything to
do with the right of publicity. That commercial speech may be more
easily verified or is less subject to deterrence for fear of being sued
over an honest mistake has little bearing on whether someone should
be compensated for the economic value of their identity. Since right
of publicity is designed to prevent all nonconsensual commercial uses,
not just those involving some kind of factual error or deception,231 that
the speech may be more easily verifiable or less subject to deterrence
is simply irrelevant. Finally, to the extent that commercial speech
distinctions are animated by the need to protect consumers, 232 that
interest too is inapplicable. The right of publicity protects individual
economic interests, not broader concerns about the integrity of the
marketplace.233
This is not to say that there is no room for any right of publicity.
Even in a world where commercial speech is not categorically
diminished, there are three contexts in which the right of publicity can
be squared with the First Amendment. First, where there exists the
kind of free-riding that has been recognized to be sufficient to
support a misappropriation claim, Zacchini would permit a remedy,
regardless of whether the speech involved were commercial or some
other kind. Second, where the appropriation of one's identity has no
relevance to an expressive or artistic message the right of publicity
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices... the purpose of
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to
commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.").
230. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pubrg, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
231. Nevertheless, many right of publicity cases also incorporate false endorsement or
association claims. These cases ordinarily allege tandem violations of both state law right
of publicity and section 43(a)(1)(A) of the federal Lanham Act, which is designed to
protect "consumers and competitors from a wide variety of misrepresentations of products
and services in commerce." Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). Lanham Act claims require some proof that consumers are likely to have been
confused, and the absence of any such requirement with the right of publicity means that it
is a somewhat broader remedy than the Lanham Act. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). As I discuss below, this difference may be quite important from a
First Amendment perspective, particularly one that does not seek to devalue commercially
motivated speech based on facile categorizations. See infra Part HI.B.3.
232- See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
233. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See
generally MCCARTHY, supra note 198, § 28:14.
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may be viewed as consistent with First Amendment values. Third,
false endorsement claims, which are increasingly brought in tandem
with right of publicity claims, should also remain in some form.
Remaining problematic are applications of the right of publicity
where there is no serious issue of false endorsement and the manner
in which courts address falsity claims in endorsement cases.
1. The Limits of Free-Riding
Over the last decade, courts have begun to pay more attention to
how the underlying interests served by the right of publicity jibe with
First Amendment values.2 It is still true that in the context of more
traditional advertising claims, constitutionality has largely been
assumed.235 Mixed purpose speech, on the other hand, has of late been
receiving more First Amendment consideration, but there has yet to
develop a consistent, coherent doctrine governing these kinds of
claims.236 This is so in part, I believe, because courts have been
focusing on the wrong questions. Rather than looking at whether the
underlying interests being served in a particular context are
sufficiently weighty to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, as the
Supreme Court did in Zacchini, courts have continued to be
distracted by the degree of commerciality of the underlying
expression which, for many of the reasons discussed in the previous
section of this article, 237 leads one down the wrong path. To examine
why this is so, this article first looks at more traditional advertising,
and then considers mixed purpose speech implicating the right of
publicity.
a. Advertising Uses
Most right of publicity claims challenging what may be viewed as
traditional advertising or promotional uses of identity include claims
234. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 930-36 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-87 (9th Cir. 2001); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 968-77 (10th Cir. 1996).
235. See generally BRODY & JOHNSON, supra note 26, § 9:3, at 9-6 (2d ed. 2004).
236. At least six different approaches can be identified. See Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (actual malice); Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 970-77 (10th Cir. 1996) (balancing of
interests); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
(alternative avenues); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (artistic
relevance or explicit deception); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003)
(predominant use); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
2001) (transformative use).
237. See supra Part II.B.
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of false endorsement2 and are discussed in the following section of
this article. 39 Not all advertising-based right of publicity cases fall into
this category, however. Consider, for example, Oliveira v. Frito-Lay,
Inc.Y In 1964 Astrud Oliveira, better known as Astrud Gilberto,
recorded the Grammy-winning song The Girl from Ipanema. Thirty
years later, Frito-Lay decided that the recording would serve as the
perfect background music for a commercial promoting low-fat baked
potato chips. The ad featured several famous models lounging by the
pool looking crestfallen that their bags of low-fat Baked Lay's Potato
Chips were empty. The camera panned to a shot of Miss Piggy, also
reclining by the pool, eating the chips and passing the empty bags to
the models, all the while singing along with Gilberto's recording
playing in the background. Frito-Lay licensed the underlying
composition and recording from the copyright owners, but it neither
sought nor obtained Gilberto's permission to use her voice. 24' She
sued claiming both false endorsement under the Lanham Act and
violation of her right of publicity. The Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of her endorsement claim, recognizing that under the
circumstances no one could reasonably think that Gilberto was
endorsing Lay's chips.242 It did, however, allow the right of publicity
claim to go forward because no element of false endorsement was
required by the New York law under which the case arose.243
Such a result is unsound and should be prohibited by the First
Amendment. This is certainly not the kind of case contemplated by
Zacchini, as neither of the touchstones identified there were remotely
238. See generally David Kohler, Michael M. Epstein & Robert C. Lind, Has Celebrity
Been Federalized? Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act as a Substitute for the Right of
Publicity, 2003 Media Law Resource Center Bulletin, No. 4, January 13, 2004, at 21-22; cf.
Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The basis of a right of
publicity claim concerns the message-whether the plaintiff endorses, or appears to
endorse the product in question.").
239. See infra Part III.B.3.
240. 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001).
241. Id. at 58.
242 Id. at 60.
243. Id. at 63-64. Frito-Lay defended under a statutory exception to New York's right
of publicity law providing in effect that no such claim would lie where a party places his
name or voice in the public domain in connection with the sale or disposition of a musical
or artistic work. The issue turned on whether Gilberto had retained any contractual rights
to the composition, and the court held that this issue could not be resolved at the motion
to dismiss stage. Id. at 63-64. The outcome of that issue does not change the constitutional
analysis, however. Any right Gilberto retained pursuant to an agreement would be
enforceable by her against the other party to the contract. The right of publicity would
provide a separate and independent right as to a non-contractual party who might not
even be aware of any of the claimant's contractual rights.
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present. Gilberto was presumably compensated for recording The
Girl from Ipanema, and there simply is no credible argument that use
of the recording in this context would threaten her livelihood. 2A Nor
was there any suggestion that the right Gilberto asserted was
necessary to provide the economic incentive to perform; the only
conceivable interest Gilberto had was in being compensated for her
position as a cultural icon resulting from the popularity of the song,245
a value that is ancillary to the attribute of identity on which she made
her living-her voice. Gilberto's interest is no different from the
interest every celebrity has in compensation any time someone trades
off their iconic status.m We do not permit celebrities to restrict
authors from writing about them,2 7 nor do we limit the right of
filmmakers to make movies or documentaries about their lives. 24 The
motives behind these kinds of activities may be no less commercial
than Frito-Lay's motive to sell its potato chips through a creative and
humorous ad, and unless we are going to start making the kinds of
value judgments about expression that the First Amendment
ordinarily prohibits, it's difficult to see how such cases can stand.
Not only is protecting identity in cases like this unnecessary to
encourage creation, such protection may actually stifle innovation
and undermine creativity. By extending the right of publicity to
protect a celebrity's general iconic status, the right may, in some
cases, conflict with other core intellectual property interests. In
Gilberto's case, the owners of the copyright in the composition had a
direct interest in exploiting the work, an interest that Gilberto's claim,
if sustained, would block. A similar problem was presented by the
244. Were ancillary revenue streams important to Gilberto, she certainly could have
protected herself by insisting on contractual guarantees before the song was released.
245. Indeed, central to Gilberto's clam was that she had become famous as The Girl
from Ipanema and that the song had effectively become her trademark. Id. at 60. The
Court of Appeals rejected her claim because it would stretch the definition of trademark
too far. See id. at 63.
246. A similarly misguided example of a celebrity's iconic status defeating a First
Amendment defense is Clark v. America Online, Inc., No. CV-98-5650 CAS (CWX) 2000
WL 33535712 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2000). The case arose from a promotional mailing by
AOL targeting members of the American Association of Retired Persons that stated: "If
you danced to the Beatles, cruised in a Thunderbird, or tuned into Dick Clark, you have
earned... 100 hours [of free Internet service]." Id at *3-4. Clark's name was used to
define an era which he and those targeted by the promotion were part of. Any interest he
had in being paid for this use was far removed from his livelihood as a television and music
personality. The opinion makes not a single reference to Zacchini, and includes little First
Amendment analysis. See id. at *22-27.
247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
248. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Dora v. Frontline
Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (Ct. App. 1993).
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Ninth Circuit's broad extension of the right of publicity in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.249 to encompass virtually any use
that evokes a celebrity's persona. Dissenting from denial of a
rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski recognized the important point
that "overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as under
protecting it [because] ... overprotection stifles the very creative
forces it's supposed to nurture."' '  In a celebrity-driven culture like
ours, the ability to reference those who often play a central role in
shaping ideas, setting trends and influencing behavior is necessary to
promote creative freedom. As is the case with other forms of
intellectual property, because the right of publicity is imposed "at the
expense of future creators,"' ' it is critical that its reach be limited to
instances where the countervailing interests are directly and
immediately threatened.
Cases like Oliveira and White stand in contrast with those that do
directly threaten the kinds of fundamental interests identified in
Zacchini. For example, one who offers his services as a fashion model
seeks to profit directly from the exploitation of some element of his
identity. 2 Value here is derived directly from the characteristic of
identity that is being exploited, not secondarily from general fame or
some other activity with which the person is associated. If a model's
likeness cannot be protected in this context, his or her livelihood can
be severely compromised, if not destroyed, and the incentive to make
an investment in the endeavor potentially will be lost253
Alternatively, consider cases where famous singers have
successfully sued over advertising uses of sound-alike performers who
imitate their voice and singing style.2 These cases, unlike Oliveira,
also may directly implicate "the very activity by which the entertainer
acquired his [or her] reputation in the first place." 5 If such a practice
were not actionable, why would someone hire, for example, Bette
249. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
250. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 1516.
252. Cf Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
that unconsented use of fashion model's photograph "stripped [Toney] of the right to
control the commercial value of her identity.").
253. The problem is particularly acute with non-celeority models who may not be able
to allege a claim of false endorsement. See Albert v. Apex Fitness, Inc., 44 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1855, No. 97 Civ. 1151(LAK), 1997 WL 323899 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
254. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
255. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Pubrg. Co., 433 U.S. 562,576 (1977).
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Midler, when for a fraction of the cost they could free-ride by getting
someone else who sounded just like her and aped her style?
b. Beyond Pure Advertising
If there are problems with application of the right of publicity to
forms of expression that qualify as purely commercial speech, they
pale in comparison to the chaos that currently reigns when the right
of publicity comes into conflict with expression that simply does not
fit within the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.?1
Currently, there have emerged no fewer than six tests to judge when
the First Amendment comes into play and how much protection it
offers 57 The central problem arises from a focus on evaluating the
worth of the expression being challenged rather than the underlying
interests being served by the right of publicity. Consider two recent
decisions by the highest courts of California and Missouri involving
the use of celebrities as inspiration for comic book characters. In
California, the publisher of the comic book Jonah Hex was sued when
it introduced two half man-half worm creatures known as Johnny and
Edgar Autumn which were inspired by the real life albino rock
musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter. The claim was dismissed by
the California Supreme Court applying a test that extends First
Amendment protection against right of publicity claims to uses of
identity that are transformative5 9 Shortly thereafter, the Missouri
Supreme Court faced a virtually identical claim involving the comic
book Spawn, except that the new character was inspired by a
professional hockey player. ° This time the court upheld the claim
because it believed that the use of identity here "predominantly
exploits the commercial value of an individual's identity .... ,261
256. Some courts simply avoid the issue by classifying mixed purpose speech as
commercial. See O'Grady v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 5:02 CV173, 2003 WL
24174616 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2003) (television interstitials contrasting documentary and
soon to be released motion picture); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2001) (photograph of plaintiffs used to illustrate 700 word story on surfing in a
magazine primarily designed to build retailer's brand awareness).
257. See supra note 236.
258. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473,476 (Cal. 2003).
259. Id. at 477-80. According to the California Supreme Court, the "inquiry is whether
the celebrity likeness is one of the 'raw materials' from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question." Id at 477.
260. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,374 (Mo. 2003).
261. Id
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The courts in these cases took different approaches to
reconciling the right of publicity with the First Amendment, but both
fundamentally focused on the commerciality of the underlying
speech, assuming that if the requisite economic motive were present,
the speech should somehow lose constitutional protection. 262 The
defects in Missouri's approach are most obvious. Whether the Spawn
comic book's "metaphorical reference.., has very little literary value
compared to its commercial value" is precisely the kind of inquiry the
First Amendment prohibits-or at least should prohibit. As Professor
Volokh recently observed, many forms of fully protected literary or
audiovisual works derive their value from use of a famous person's
identity, and "[F]irst Amendment law.., hasn't distinguished, and
shouldn't distinguish high art... from low.., just as it hasn't
distinguished high literature from low."2 3
California's approach, although more protective, and more
carefully reasoned, is also misguided. The transformative use
approach was first articulated in Comedy III Productions v. Gary
Saderup, Inc.,264 which arose out of a realistic portrait of The Three
Stooges that was reproduced onto T-shirts and prints. Although
purporting to eschew any reliance on the "quality of the
expression," 26 by focusing as it did on discerning whether the
expression was primarily -for "commercial gain," 266 the court made
effectively the same mistake the Missouri Supreme Court made by
creating an approach which will be difficult to apply consistently and
which devalues expression for reasons that cannot be reconciled with
the underlying First Amendment values.267 The problems that lie
262 Right of publicity cases focus on "whether the use of a person's name and identity
is 'expressive,' in which case it is fully protected, or 'commercial,' in which case it is
generally not protected." See id. at 373-74; Winter, 69 P.3d at 478 ("[W]hen an artist's skill
and talent is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait
of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame, then the author's right of free
expression is subordinated by the right of publicity.").
263. Volokh, supra note 46, at 909; see Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)
("What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing
of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the
protection of free speech as the best of literature.").
264. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
265. Id at 809.
266. Id at 806-07.
267. For a comprehensive criticism of California's transformative test, see F. Jay
Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test for Analyzing a
First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of
Art, 27 COLUM. J.L & ARTS 1 (2003).
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ahead with the California approach were signaled by a footnote in
Saderup which acknowledged:
[I]t could be argued that reproduction of a celebrity likeness for
non commercial use--e.g., t-shirts of a deceased rock musician
produced by a fan as a not-for-profit tribute is a form of
personal expression and therefore more worthy of First
Amendment protection.2
Although the court declined to decide this issue, the conflict
highlights a central flaw in its approach: why should two instances of
identical expression be treated differently simply because only one is
motivated by a desire to profit? And if it is the case that a difference
exists, should a report on CNN, a profit-making enterprise, get less
protection than an identical report on non-profit PBS? Certainly we
know this latter proposition flies in the face of fundamental First
Amendment principles, and I suggest that the former does, too.
The flaws in the California (and Missouri) approach derive from
a misinterpretation of the scope of Zacchini. Although appearing to
recognize that Zacchini was "not an ordinary right of publicity
case," 269 the California Supreme Court went on to conflate the limited
interests in protecting against the loss of creative incentive through
free-riding that were central to Zacchini with a far broader notion of
unjust enrichment that "derives primarily from the fame of the
celebrity depicted." ' 0 This latter interest arising from the general
iconic status of a celebrity is one that Zacchini appeared to reject as
sufficient to trump the First Amendment when the Court explained
that it was not validating claims which derive generally from an
"entertainer's reputation. ' 27V In the particular context of Saderup,
Zacchini would protect the interest of The Three Stooges in their
comedic performances-the very activity from which their fame
derives-but it would not protect ancillary interests deriving from
their general fame as entertainers, such as an artistic drawing of their
likeness when used in non-deceptive ways.
Parodying baseball players on humorous and often biting trading
cards,2n using famous albino rock musicians273 or hockey players24 as
268. 21 P.3d at 808, n.9.
269. Id at 806.
270. Id. at 810.
271. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Publ'g Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
272 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959 (10th
Cir. 1996).
273. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 475 (Cal. 2003).
274. See Doe v. TO Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
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inspiration for comic book characters, and selling kitschy prints or
statues featuring celebrities275 all involve forms of expression that seek
to profit from the fame of others. From a First Amendment
perspective, the important question in such cases is whether a
restriction on speech is necessary to prevent the destruction of
fundamentally important motivational interests of the sort identified
in Zacchini, not whether and to what extent the speaker is seeking to
profit. This approach is consistent with core notions of First
Amendment analysis where speech gives way to content-based laws
only in the most limited and compelling circumstances. The approach
of the courts that continue to devalue speech based on vague notions
of commerciality in order broadly to protect the ancillary financial
interests of celebrities is at odds with those First Amendment
interests.
2. Gratuitous Uses
In addition to claims that implicate the kind of free-riding
concerns at issue in Zacchini, the Second Circuit in Rogers v.
Grimaldi26 has suggested that the gratuitous misuse of one's identity
might also trump First Amendment considerations. The Rogers
standard asks in the first instance whether the use of someone's
identity in a work has relevance to some artistic (or informational)
expression. If it does, then no liability attaches unless the work is
explicitly misleading as to a false endorsement.m The kind of
gratuitous use of celebrity identity addressed in Rogers can be
analogized to the utterance of defamatory speech involving no issue
of public concern; neither implicates values at the core of the First
AmendmentV 8
If applied correctly, the Rogers approach has something to
commend it. Consider, for example, the use of Tiger Woods' name in
connection with two different hypothetical promotional messages:
275. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Martin Luther
King, Jr. Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga.
1982).
276. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1994). Rogers arose in the context of a movie title, but other
courts have applied its principles in other circumstances as well. See Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 899 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th Cir. 2000).
277. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
27& See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-60
(1985).
[28:145
Tiger Woods doesn't drive a Ford Explorer, but if he did, we think
he'd love the car.
Tiger Woods doesn't endorse our cars, but he does drive a Ford
Explorer.
If we assume that both statements are entirely accurate"9 and
neither implies a false endorsement, 2m should Woods nevertheless
have a right of publicity action as to either? Strictly in terms of the
interest analysis discussed in the preceding section, 1 the answer
would be no. Both promotions use Woods' name in their iconic sense
only; neither would constitute the kind of free-riding that threatens
his incentive to perform in his chosen line of work as a professional
golfer. Yet there is a significant difference between these promotions.
In the first, the use of Woods' name is entirely gratuitous; it is used
simply to attract attention, not to impart any useful information or
make any kind of artistic statement. The second is slightly different; it
tells us what kind of car Woods drives, which may be important to
some potential purchasers who are influenced in their purchasing
decisions by what leaders of popular culture do. Under the Rogers
approach, it seems to me that the second promotion would be
protected while the first wouldn't, a result that has some appeal and
seems consistent with the First Amendment.
The difficulty with the Rogers line of reasoning lies not in its
analytical consistency with First Amendment values, but with its
potential for misuse; in at least two recent decisions, this element of
Rogers has been applied in ways that appear designed to reach
particular results that might be viscerally appealing but which are at
odds with the First Amendment. Parks v. LaFace Records2m arose out
of a song by OutKast entitled Rosa Parks, the lyrics of which featured
a reprise referring to Parks' refusal to move to the back of a
segregated bus during the civil rights movement. 2 Although adopting
the Rogers artistic relevance test,284 the court, in what can fairly be
described as a strained application of the standard, determined that
use of Parks' name was irrelevant since the song wasn't about Parks
279. Of course, in the real world we know neither of these statements is correct. Tiger
Woods, in fact, has an endorsement deal with Buick. See Woods Uses Familiar Formula 2
Weeks Before a Major, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,2005, at C26.
280. The first hypothetical is a variation on one discussed in Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major
League Baseball Players' Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1996), which the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals characterized as not implying a false endorsement.
281. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
282. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
283. The line in the song was "Everybody move to the back of the bus." Id. at 442-43.
284. See id. at 450.
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or her heroic stance.m A similarly cramped reading of Rogers is found
in O'Grady v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,2 where the court
permitted a military hero's claim to proceed, in part on the grounds
that there was an issue of fact as to whether interstitial programming
that contrasted a soon to be released movie inspired by the plaintiff's
story with a documentary of the real events was sufficiently related to
the plaintiff.27
A standard based on what is a matter of public concern has been
criticized as being too amorphous and having the potential for the
kind of unpredictable results oriented decision-making that is
anathema to the First Amendment.n Yet in practice, that generally
has not turned out to be the case, at least in the area of defamation,
where the concept is central to the degree of protection that is
accorded to speech.2 Courts have largely taken to heart the Supreme
Court's admonition that judges should avoid becoming too involved
in such matters for fear of inhibiting editorial freedom. m Although
the Rogers court characterized relevance as imposing only a "low
threshold,,291 it remains to be seen whether the concept of
gratuitousness also will be handled in a way that avoids stifling
creativity or editorial choice, but at least the early returns are not
promising.
3. False Endorsement
Finally, as discussed at some length earlier in this article, the
element of falsity can affect how the respective interests balance
where First Amendment values are implicated. Falsity, of course, is
not an element of the right of publicity, but it has played a role where
such claims are met with a constitutional defense. A number of
courts, particularly in New York and California, have reasoned that
proof of falsity coupled with the requisite showing of fault can
285. See id at 452-53. The reference was intended to suggest that other musical acts
were inferior to OutKast and should, therefore, metaphorically move to the back of the
bus. However, the notion of inferiority was precisely what Parks was protesting when she
refused to relinquish her seat, and while the OutKast allusion is exponentially more trivial,
it is hardly unrelated in any artistic sense.
286. No. 5:02 CV173, 2003 WL 24174616 (E.D Tex. Dec. 19,2003).
287. See id at *29.
28& See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78-79 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §
23.5 at 3-86-87 (2005).
289. See SACK, supra note 166, § 6.6.
290. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
291. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1994).
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override any defense under the First Amendment.2 2 A leading
commentator has strongly criticized this approach as "bizarre"
because it imports into the right of publicity "an element wholly
foreign" to the tort.2 3
Whether or not one views the importation of falsity into the right
of publicity as appropriate or not,2 the issue will remain, as many, if
not most, right of publicity cases incorporate tandem claims of false
endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act where falsity is a
central element of an action.2 Thus, the question becomes whether
and under what circumstances proof of a false endorsement will
suffice to trump the First Amendment.
The willingness of courts to factor First Amendment interests
into the Lanham Act has largely depended on whether a claim arises
from commercial speech or the more fully protected variety. Cases
involving speech categorized as purely commercial have ordinarily
refused to account for First Amendment values.2z Where fully
292. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001);
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198
Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Davis v. High Soc. Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982). More recently, New York appears to have retreated from
permitting falsity to resurrect a right of publicity claim. See Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr
Printing and Publ'g., 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000).
293. MCCARTHY, supra note 198, §8:85.
294. Professor McCarthy's objection to importing falsity into the right of publicity has
considerable analytical force. The interest primarily underlying the publicity right-
protection of an individual's right to profit from use of their identity-has nothing to do
with falsity. This interest is equally present whether or not the use is accurate or not. For
example, Tiger Woods' economic interest in the print of him that was the subject of ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publg., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) exists regardless of whether
distribution of the work implies that he endorsed it. Where falsity is an element of a cause
of action, its presence or absence is closely related to the interest being protected.
Defamation, for example, protects only unjustified harm to reputation. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Accordingly, such claims are limited to
statements that implicate this interest-that is, which if false would wrongfully hold the
person up to public ridicule or disgrace. See generally SACK, supra note 166, § 2.4.1. The
right of publicity has no such limitation, and it may apply even to expression which places
the claimant in a favorable light. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d
1391 (9th Cir. 1996); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). The lack of any limiting principle with the right of
publicity has the potential to swallow up these other kinds of actions, a result that would
be of dubious constitutional validity. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55
(1988).
295. See Kohler, et al., supra note 238, at 21-22.
296. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 945 (2001); White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
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protected speech is the subject of a claim, courts have been more
willing to impose significant constitutional barriers.m
False endorsement claims may bear some similarity to false
advertising claims involving assertions about the quality or character
of goods or services made or sold by a speaker. In one sense, a false
endorsement claim may be viewed as a representation about a
characteristic of the speaker's product or service, and whether the
representation is true should be fully within the speaker's knowledge.
Often, however, these cases present a twist which can complicate the
analogy to more typical false advertising claims.
While a claim of endorsement may be direct and obvious, and
the inquiry into its accuracy relatively simple and straightforward, this
is not always the case, particularly when mixed-product speech or
more creative forms of advertising are involved.m Where the
endorsement is not explicit, the central question is not so much about
the characteristics of the speaker's product or service, but rather how
the message is likely to be perceived by consumers.299 At least where
an implication of endorsement is unintended, the answer to this
question may well not be particularly within the sphere of the
speaker's knowledge, and in this sense the cases more closely
resemble defamation or disparagement cases where the speaker often
has no more access to the underlying issue of perception or accuracy
than does the plaintiff. The significance of this is that at least one of
the key factors advanced in support of a rule allowing broader
regulation of false commercial speech-verifiability--often may not
operate in some false endorsement cases with the same force as it
does in other kinds of false advertising cases involving specific claims
about a speakers goods or services."
Equally important, in these types of ambiguous endorsement
cases, the durability factor also may not operate as powerfully.
Commercial advertising about the particular qualities of one's
product or service is often a necessary part of doing business. Sellers
have little choice but to promote their products and thus may be less
297. See, e.g., Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186; Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d
Cir. 1989).
298. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (whether
use in a themed bar of animatronic robots depicting characters in television program
suggested endorsement by actors who played the characters); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g,
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (whether depiction of golfer in a print suggested
he endorsed the product).
299. See. e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).
300. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
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susceptible to being deterred. Right of publicity cases-particularly
those involving the use of someone's identity in mixed speech
products-often involve activity that is more creative and,
importantly, more optional. Frito-Lay could easily have used a less
well known song than The Girl from Ipanema and still made its point.
Gary Saderup could have drawn a more abstract version of The
Three Stooges and still made a nice T-shirt. The existence of
alternatives in these cases makes it more likely that the process of
creation and expression will be corrupted by a rule that imposes
liability too strictly.'O'
The law as it presently exists in the purely commercial context
usually addresses questions of implied endorsement using a multi-
factor test to assess whether consumers are likely to have been
confused by the use.3°2 Where fully protected uses of persona are
implicated, some courts have focused instead on the subjective intent
of the speaker through application of the actual malice standard first
developed in the context of defamation cases."' There are important
differences between these two approaches. Where the multi-factor
approach is employed, the inquiry is objective-would a reasonable
consumer likely be confused-and the answer is usually for the jury
to decide.3°4 Actual malice is considerably more protective of First
Amendment values and unmeritorious cases are more readily
disposed of through pre-trial motions, sparing the defendant the
uncertainty and cost of a trial.'
Although there are significant differences between these
approaches, reconciling them in a world where the commerciality of
the expression is not the central distinguishing factor does not
necessarily portend a sea change in how most false endorsement cases
will ultimately be resolved. It is possible, I believe, to account for the
underlying First Amendment breathing space needed in false
endorsement cases while protecting consumers from being unduly
misled 6 by adopting a two level approach.
301. See Kohler, supra note 172, at 1218-19.
302. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447-48 (6th Cir. 2003); White v.
Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1992).
303. Cf ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935 (6th Cir. 2003); Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001).
304. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1401; Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp.
612, 627-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While the defendant's intent is among the factors considered,
it is not the dispositive factor. See White, 971 F.2d at 1400-01; Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 628.
305. See generally SACK, supra note 166, §§ 5.4.2, 16.3.1.2.
306. Concern about the integrity of the marketplace is the central concern of the
Lanham Act, not compensating individuals for the commercial value of the identity. See,
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Initially, the question should be whether there is an explicitly
misleading use of identity as outlined by the Second Circuit in Rogers
v. Grimaldi.3°7 Since the accuracy of the underlying content is unlikely
to be in dispute in such cases, one who uses words designed explicitly
to mislead the consumer can hardly claim innocence." In effect, in
the context of a false endorsement claim, an explicitly misleading use
of another's identity is tantamount to a knowing falsity and should
present no serious First Amendment problem.
Where the implication of endorsement is not obvious, the
question becomes more difficult. Do First Amendment concerns
require that the law shield even the unscrupulous operator who is
clever enough to disguise their message? Creative or ambiguous uses
of identity may have the potential to inform, entertain, and mislead
all at the same time. This is so whether the use is purely commercial,31 °
311mixed,311 or even purely expressive. 2 Compare, for example, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America,313 a
case involving speech that was clearly commercial, with the Sixth
Circuit's analysis in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing,4 which involved
artistic speech that was of the mixed variety and held to be entitled to
full constitutional protection.
White arose out of a television commercial for Samsung, an
electronics company, that used a humorous takeoff of a futuristic
version of the popular game show Wheel of Fortune to deliver a
message of innovation and lasting quality. The commercial featured a
e.g., Allen, 610 F. Supp at 625. To the extent individual interests predominate, such as
protecting reputation or not being shown in a false light, those interests do not differ from
those protected by defamation or false light invasion of privacy, and should not be treated
any differently.
307. 875 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1994).
308. Rogers was concerned with the issue in the context of titles and gave as examples
of explicit deception titles falsely incorporating someone's name into the title or phrases
expressly suggesting endorsement, such as "an authorized biography." 875 F.2d at 999.
The Rogers approach has since been expanded beyond titles, see supra note 276, and it is
not difficult to imagine examples of explicitly misleading works in other contexts. A
particularly deserving example can be found in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir. 1992), which involved a Tom Waits voice impersonator who delivered an express
endorsement of the product.
309. Cf Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 629 ("Having gone to great lengths to evoke plaintiff's
image, defendants must do more than pay lip service to avoiding confusion.").
310. White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 975 F.2d 1395, 1400-04 (9th Cir. 1992).
311. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925-29 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,374 (Mo. 2003).
312. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180,1185-87 (9th Cir. 2001).
313. 975 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
314. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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robot in the role of the letter turner on the show, a role most
famously, though not exclusively,3"5 filled by Vanna White. White
sued under the Lanham Act, claiming that the ad implied that she
endorsed Samsung products.
ETW involved the sale of mass market prints created from a
painting by artist Rick Rush that featured the world's leading golfer
Tiger Woods among a pantheon of golfers who had won The Masters
golf tournament. Among other things, Woods' suit alleged that sale of
the prints carried an implication that he endorsed them.
White prevailed, while Woods lost, not because of any real
difference in the culpability of the respective defendants' conduct, but
due to the different levels of protection accorded commercial and
artistic speech. Yet is that really a distinction that has any relevance
to the differing outcomes in these cases? Was Samsung's very clever
ad really any more commercial than Rush's mass produced prints?
Did the artistic merit in Rush's work contribute that much more to
the idea marketplace than the message of innovation contained in the
Samsung ad? Or did the underlying commercial purpose of the
Samsung ad so diminish its value as a parody of White and Wheel of
Fortune as to render its own creative merit meaningless? These are
questions about which reasonable people can differ, but perhaps
precisely because of that, they are the kind of questions that we
should not need to ask in evaluating the constitutional
appropriateness of a standard of liability.
To be sure, a legitimate interest exists in protecting consumers
from being misled by false implications of endorsement, but that
truism begs a very important question: is that interest adequately
served by making categorical distinctions between commercial and
other kinds of speech,316 and are there other methods of protecting
that interest that are less damaging to First Amendment values? As
to protecting consumers from being misled, the
commercial/noncommercial distinction is both under and over
inclusive. It is under inclusive because, as illustrated by the
comparison of White and ETW, the distinction fails to catch a number
of cases where there may be some false implication of endorsement in
the context of speech having what can be viewed as somewhat
marginally communicative value but which, nonetheless, is protected
315. The original letter turner on Wheel of Fortune was Susan Stafford, who occupied
the role from 1975 to 1982. See The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0821345 (last visited November 15, 2005).
316. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424-26 (1993).
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fully by the First Amendment. It is over inclusive because it penalizes
an unprotected class of cases like White which disseminate a
significant message and employ creative artistry that is largely
indistinguishable from the protected class of expression.
Perhaps more important, not only is drawing the distinction an
unhelpful way to separate the wheat from the chaff, but it is
unnecessary as well. Were the application of the more First
Amendment friendly actual malice standard likely to result in
advertisers being given carte blanche to misuse celebrities' identities
in advertising by misleading the consuming public, I might have real
reservations about suggesting its adoption.317 That is unlikely to be the
case, however, for several reasons. Although the basic inquiry here is
subjective-did the speaker intend to convey a false endorsement-at
least in the context of most advertising, a naked assertion by an
advertiser that an implication of endorsement was unintended would
be unlikely to carry the day absent some persuasive, non-gratuitous
explanation as to why a celebrity's identity was used. Actual malice
can be proved circumstantially,318 so in the case of a pure
advertisement, it would, for example, be fair to consider evidence that
"use of celebrity endorsement in television commercials is so well
established by common custom that a jury might find an implied
endorsement in [an advertisers'] use of the celebrity's name which
would not inhere in a newspaper . . . .019 Also relevant in the
advertising context would be the kind of objective factors that are
currently used to gauge likely consumer reaction.3 ° Such customs
when evaluated in the context of the relevant circumstantial factors
would likely make it difficult for advertisers to trade brazenly off of
celebrity persona in ways that are likely to mislead the public. Absent
some credible, non-deceptive informational or artistic basis for using
a celebrity's likeness, an advertiser "having gone to great lengths to
evoke [a celebrity] image ... must do more than pay lip service to
avoiding confusion."32' The difference would be that objective
circumstantial factors would not necessarily be dispositive,
317. I refer predominantly to celebrities because most cases are brought by famous
people. This is not always the case, however, and where the plaintiff is not a public figure,
it is possible that the balance of interests might favor a less demanding standard such as
negligence. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
31& See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667-68
(1985).
319. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp 85 F.3d 407,413 (9th Cir. 1996).
320. See, e.g., id.
321. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612,629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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particularly when negated by a credible countervailing interest, such
as the need to evoke another's identity for the purposes of parody, as
in White.
The standard has the advantage of being relatively simple and
straightforward. It does not seek to make value judgments about the
quality of the expression, distinguishing, for example, high art from
low. It also provides significant "breathing space" for the creative
process, but does not allow the use of identity in ways that are
intended to mislead the public. In short, it would adequately protect
the public from real harms without unduly impinging on First
Amendment interests to avoid imaginary ones.
IV. Conclusion
A little more than 85 years ago, the Supreme Court began
grappling with how much latitude to give the government in
restricting advocacy it found threatening to public order.3n At first,
the Court proceeded cautiously, allowing the creation of broad
categories of speech that were deemed to present a clear and present
danger of bringing about some substantive evil the government
wanted to prevent.3 3 Over the next 50 years, the Court's approach to
this issue evolved, in fits and starts,31A to the point where the
government's ability to restrain expression it considers dangerous is
now significantly constrained.3z2
The history of the Court's approach to commercial speech bears
some similarity. Initially, the government was given relatively
unfettered authority to regulate. Thirty years ago, the Court began to
retreat from its earlier position by extending limited but real
protection to such expression. The development of commercial
speech doctrine evolved through periods of apparent expansion and
then contraction leading ultimately to the current state of play, which
tends to view the First Amendment expansively.3 6
Although some members of the Court have begun to challenge
the conventional wisdom that a primarily commercial purpose makes
expression somewhat less worthy of protection, commercial speech
322 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919).
323. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Debs, 249 U.S. at 211.
324. Compare DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) with Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
325. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
326. See BRODY & JOHNSON, supra note 26, Chapter 6.
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doctrine has yet to be brought in line with modern First Amendment
doctrine as it relates to most other forms of expression. My purpose
in writing is to suggest that perhaps it is time to take the final step.
The problems of classification that have emerged with mixed purpose
speech will only grow more difficult in a world where neat distinctions
are increasingly elusive and the reasons for making them in the first
place are increasingly irrelevant. While the approach I suggest will
not magically eliminate hard or controversial decisions, it will, I
believe, lead to more predictable and consistent First Amendment
decision-making that is more in line with the approach followed in
virtually all other cases.
